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ARTICLES

PERSON OR THING-IN SEARCH OF THE
LEGAL STATUS OF A FETUS: A SURVEY
OF NORTH CAROLINA LAW
TONY HARTSOE*

What is the status of a fetus in North Carolina? This the primary
question addressed by Mr. Hartsoe as he analyzes and critiques the
case law and statutory enactments which deal with this question.
While there is some case law and statutory authority on point, Mr.
Hartsoe concludes that there is an overall paucity of law which
defines the legal status of a fetus and, furthermore, the law that
does exist is inconsistent. As such, Mr. Hartsoeexamines the legal
status of a fetus in North Carolinain the areas of wrongful death,
prenatal injury, criminal law, wrongful life, wrongful birth, and
wrongful conception. After analyzing relevant cases and statutes,
Mr. Hartsoe explores the rationales used by courts in developing
case law in each area. Further,Mr. Hartsoe then suggests changes
in this law and examines the problems inherent in maintainingthe
different legal statuses of a fetus. In closing, Mr. Hartsoeprovides
a comprehensive bibliography in each area with practical notes
that should unequivocally aid the practitioner who delves into
these areas.
I.

INTRODUCTION

North Carolina has seldom litigated the status of the fetus in
any context. Like most states, it has followed the common law
until this century. When wrongful death statutes became prevalent, the tide turned in favor of recognizing a child's cause of
action for injuries received in the womb. Scientific recognition
* Mr. Hartsoe is a litigation associate at Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice
in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Mr. Hartsoe practices in the areas of
Workers' Compensation, Insurance Defense, Civil Rights, and Constitutional
Law. Mr. Hartsoe received his J.D. from Washington University School of Law.
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that human life begins at conception has given courts and legislatures reason to reexamine the law as it applies to the unborn,
especially in the areas of tort and criminal law. Federal abortion
law, beginning with Roe v. Wade, 1 set the stage for direct conflict
between federal constitutional law and state law attempting to
protect the unborn child. As further scientific advances in the
area of reproductive technology continue to proliferate, the status
of the law as it concerns the unborn will fall more frequently into
question as the rationales for different legal policies conflict.
Accordingly, knowledge of the legal rationales for either allowing
or denying actions for prenatal injuries, wrongful death, wrongful
life, wrongful birth, wrongful conception, and criminal murder
prosecutions is essential to not only understanding these types of
cases, but also in forging the proper trail for the development of
the law in other closely related areas.
This Article examines the legal status of a fetus in North Carolina in the areas of wrongful death, prenatal injury, criminal law,
wrongful life, wrongful birth, and wrongful conception. After analyzing cases and statutes relevant to each area, the Article
explores the rationales used by courts in developing the case law
in each area. The Article also suggests changes in this law and
examines the problems inherent in maintaining the different legal
statuses of the fetus among the various areas of law, suggesting
the law answer the primary question of when a fetus becomes a
person, before any meaningful discussion of the law can be
maintained.
II.
A.

NORTH CAROLINA ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

Historical Background

At common law, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury.2 Not until the enactment of The Fatal
Accidents Act of 1846, more commonly known as Lord Campbell's
Act, was the common law rule rejected. The Act provided the first
civil legal remedy for wrongful death, and it read:
[Wihenever the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of another, insuch a manner as would have entitled the party injured to have sued had death not ensued, an
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). See also W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw oF'TORTS § 127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971).
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action may be maintained if brought within twelve months after
his death in the name of3 his executor or administrator for the benefit of certain relatives.
The Act created a trend that was followed by every jurisdiction. Each state now provides a statutory remedy for wrongful
death, patterned largely on the language of Lord Campbell's statute.4 While these statutes provided a remedy for the wrongful
death of a "person," none were interpreted immediately to include
an unborn child. States routinely denied any civil legal remedies
to unborn children in any form until 1946, when the District Court
for the District of Columbia recognized for the first time a cause of
action on behalf of a viable 5 fetus who after suffering prenatally
inflicted injuries, was born alive.6 Recognition of an unborn
child's right to be born free from wrongful injury has led to the
recent recognition of right to be born.
Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia now recognize a cause of action on behalf of an unborn child either negligently or intentionally killed in utero. v Nine states which have
3. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 902.
4. See STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH, Appendix A (3d
ed. 1992) (providing a complete full-text listing of the wrongful death statutes).
5. Viability is defined as the "[c]apability of living; the state of being viable;
usually connotes a fetus that has reached 500 g in weight and 20 gestational
weeks." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1556 (5th ed. 1982).
6. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
7. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106 (1980); Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300
So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974); Summerfield v. Superior Ct., 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985);
Hatala v. Markiewicz, 244 A.2d 406 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966); Worgan v. Greggo &
Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del. 1956); Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v.
Williams, 482 A.2d 394 (D.C. App. 1984); Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1955); Wade v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573 (D.C. Haw. 1990); Volk
v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982); Crisafogeorgis v. Brandenburg, 304 N.E.2d
88 (Ill. 1973); Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); Hale v. Manion,
368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Danos v.
St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981); Odham v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md.
1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975); O'Neill v.
Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838
(Minn. 1949); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954); O'Grady v. Brown, 654
S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969); Poliquin v.
MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826
(N.M. 1980); DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987);
Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d
1053 (Ohio 1985); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v.
Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636 (Or. 1974); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (Pa.
1985); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976); Fowler v. Woodward,
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995

3

172

Campbell
Law Review, Vol.
17, Iss.
2 [1995], Art. 2
CAMPBELL
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 17:169

considered the question whether a fetus is a "person" under their
wrongful death statutes, have answered in the negative.8 The
remaining four states have yet to consider the question and, thus,
do not currently recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death
of a fetus.' In those states that do recognize a cause of action for
the wrongful death of a fetus, the great majority require the fetus
to have been viable at death before the action may accrue. 10
North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act (hereinafter "the Act"),
codified in section 28A-18-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes only recently has been interpreted to provide a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.1 ' Prior to 1969,
North Carolina's wrongful death law was expressed in two different statutes. The first, section 28-173 of the North Carolina General Statutes, provided the basis of the cause of action itself and
allowed recovery for the death of a person brought about by a
wrongful act, neglect or default of another. 2 And section 28-174
138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964); Farley v. Mt. Marty Hosp. Ass'n, 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D.
1986); Lobdell v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 710 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1986); Nelson
v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975) (allowing by implication); Vaillancourt v.
Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980); Moen v. Hanson, 537
P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971);
Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967).
8. See Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Alaska 1962) (denying a cause of
action for a nonviable stillborn infant); Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal.
1977); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Dunn v. Rose Way,
Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983); Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916 (Mont. 1984);
Egbert v. Wenzl, 260 N.W.2d 480 (Neb. 1977); Graf v. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140
(N.J. 1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969); Lawrence v.
Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969).
9. These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Maine, and Wyoming.
10. For jurisdictions not requiring the unborn child to viable at death, see
Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Presley v. Newport Hosp.,
365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976); Fryover v. Forbes, 439 N.W.2d 284 (Mich. Ct. App.
1989).
11. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489, 320 N.C. 799, 361
S.E.2d 73 (1987).
12. Section 28-173 provided:
Death by wrongful act; recovery not assets; dying declarations. - When
the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default of
another, such as would, if the injured party had lived, have entitled him
to an action for damages therefor, the persons or corporation that would
have been so liable, and his or their executors, administrators, collectors
or successors shall be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by
the executor, administrator or collector of the decedent; and this
notwithstanding the death, and although the wrongful act, neglect or
default, causing the death, amounts in law to a felony. The amount
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referred to the types of damages collectible in a wrongful death
action under section 28-173. Section 28-174 provided:
Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act.- The plaintiff in
such action may recover such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such death.1"
Under these statutes, the North Carolina Supreme Court twice
considered and twice denied a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a fetus. 1 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the issue
whether a cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn
fetus existed under the state's wrongful death statute, 15 in Gay v.
Thompson.16 Baby Gay, the plaintiff, was a viable fetus of eight
months gestation at the time he was stillborn. The administrator
of the child's estate brought the suit, alleging wrongful death
under the Wrongful Death Act. 7
Dr. Thompson, the defendant, was the doctor in charge of
Baby Gay's prenatal care and generally there had been no complications associated with the pregnancy. In fact, the court found
that on August 23, 1962, Baby Gay was normal for a child of eight
months gestation, and he was capable of a separate existence
outside of his mother's womb, provided proper medical care be
administered to him and his mother.18 The complaint alleged the
defendant negligently and prematurely induced labor, causing an
acute infection of Mrs. Gay's uterus which precipitated both her
recovered in such action is not liable to be applied as assets, in the
payment of debts or legacies, except as to burial expenses of the
deceased, and reasonable hospital and medical expenses not exceeding
five hundred dollars ($500.00) incident to the injury resulting in death;
provided that all claims filed for such services shall be approved by the
clerk of the superior court and any party adversely affected by any
decision of said clerk as to said claim may appeal to the superior court in
term time, but shall be disposed of as provided in the Intestate
Succession Act.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (repealed 1973).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. 28-174 (repealed 1973). For further discussion of the
origin and import of sections 28-173 and 28-174, see Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235
N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952); Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d
793 (1958); Bryant v. Woodlief, 252 N.C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960).
14. See Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Stetson v.
Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
17, Id.
18. Gay, 266 N.C. at 395, 146 S.E.2d at 425.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995
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death as well as Baby Gay's. The plaintiff sought fifty thousand
dollars in damages for the death of Baby Gay. 19
The court2" in Gay addressed the issue as: "whether there is a
right of action under our wrongful death statute, G.S. §§ 28-173,
28-174, by the administrator of a stillborn child who died as a
proximate result of tortious injuries to his mother and himself
while en ventre sa mere,2 when the child was viable at the time of
the injuries."22 Noting several prior cases that had interpreted
the Wrongful Death Act, the court in Gay again held the Act confined recovery to "such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such death," and the
clear language of section 28-174 of the North Carolina Statutes
made the existence of such damages a prerequisite to bringing a
wrongful death action.2 3 Thus, according to the court in Gay, "negligence alone, without pecuniary injury resulting from such
death," did not create a cause of action.2 4
In Gay the court, after citing authorities on both sides of the
issue, held "there can be no evidence from which to infer 'pecuniary injury resulting from' the wrongful prenatal death of a viable
child en ventre sa mere; it is all mere speculation."2 5 Accordingly,
the court refused to recognize a cause of action for the wrongful
death of an unborn child under the Act.
The court in Gay specifically did not rule on the issue of
whether the Act would recognize a viable fetus as a "person," as
that term was used in the statute. 26 The court also did not mention the issue of viability. The Gay court did, however, distinguish
the cause of action for prenatal injuries 2 7 suffered by an unborn
child who subsequently is born alive, from the cause of action for
the wrongful death of a child who instead is stillborn. The former
was a creature of the common law; the latter was a purely statu19. Id. at 395, 146 S.E.2d at 426.
20. Justice Parker wrote the opinion for the court. Id.
21. Id. The phrase "en ventre sa mere" means "inits mother's womb." BLAcles
LAw DIcTIoNARY (6th ed. 1990).
22. 266 N.C. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 426.
23. Id. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 428.
24. Id. (quoting Collier v. Arington's Ex'rs, 61 N.C. 356 (1868)).
25. Id. at 400, 146 S.E.2d at 429.
26. Id. at 402, 146 S.E.2d at 431.
27. This was the first time the North Carolina Supreme Court had ever
indicated a cause of action would lie in North Carolina for prenatal injuries. Id.
This language would be the foundation upon which such a cause of action would
be established in Stetson, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531.
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tory creation.2 Oddly, however, the court in Gay never noted why
this distinction bore any significance in deciding this issue.
B.

Stetson v. Easterling

2 9 placed the issue of fetal
The case of Stetson v. Easterling,
wrongful death in a new light, but it held to old conclusions. 0 In
Stetson, the plaintiff was the estate administrator of a child who
allegedly had been tortiously injured while in the womb, subsequently born alive, and who then died approximately three
months later as a result of prenatally inflicted injuries.3 1 Factually, the case was one involving the question of a child's right to
recover for prenatal injuries which subsequently led to his
32
death.
The plaintiff, however, sued for damages under the same
Wrongful Death Act which was in effect when Gay was decided. 3
The Stetson court framed the issue as whether a child who had
lived only a few months could maintain a cause of action for
wrongful death which allegedly resulted from prenatal injuries
caused by the negligence of the defendants.3 4 The first step in the
Stetson court's decision was to determine whether the plaintiff
would have a cause of action had he lived, a requirement under
the wrongful death statute.3 5 Since the injuries complained of
were inflicted while the plaintiff was still in utero, the issue was
whether the plaintiff, had he lived, would have stated a valid
cause of action in North Carolina when he sought to recover for
prenatal injuries. The Stetson court, noting this was a case of first
impression, answered in the affirmative. 6
Picking up where Gay had left off, the Stetson court, noting
copious authority in support of its position, quoted from its language in Gay, stating: "Since the child must carry the burden of
infirmity that results from another's tortious act, it is only natural
justice that it, if born alive, be allowed to maintain an action on

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 429.
274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
Id.
274 N.C. at 155, 161 S.E.2d at 532.
Id.
See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
Stetson, 274 N.C. at 155, 146 S.E.2d at 533.

35. Id.
36. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995
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the ground of actionable negligence. " 3 7 The court in Stetson,
therefore, adopted the language of Gay as authoritative in North
Carolina.38
The Stetson court addressed next the issue of whether the
plaintiff could sue for wrongful death which resulted from these
prenatally inflicted injuries. 39 The court first noted that a wrongful death claim in North Carolina was governed strictly by statute
and that what the plaintiff had alleged was a wrongful death
claim and not a survivorship claim for the pain and suffering of
the decedent. 40 Quoting the language of Gay once again, the Stetson court went from a statement of the rule that damages for
wrongful death may not be assessed on the basis of sheer speculation and that only provable pecuniary loss is recoverable, to a finding that "[hlere, as in Gay, it would be 'sheer speculation' to
attempt to assess damages as of the time of the alleged negligently inflicted fatal injuries."4 ' Stated simply, the Stetson holding was more a statement that the wrongful death statute in
North Carolina required strict proof of the actual existence of
pecuniary damages proximately caused by the plaintiff's death,
regardless of age. The court's language was ambiguous on this
point as it did not clarify whether the court saw the cause of action
for wrongful death arising at the time the injuries were inflicted or
at the time of death. 42 This would have been an important distinction in a case where the plaintiff's injuries were prenatally
inflicted, but death did not occur until after the child was born and
lived for a year or more. The point in time at which the Stetson
court would not deem the issue of damages to be "too speculative"
as a matter of law is unclear.
37. Id. at 146, 161 S.E.2d at 533-34, quoting Gay v. Taylor, 266 N.C. 394, 398,
146 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1966).
38. Id. Gay was the genesis of the prenatal injury cause of action in North
Carolina. See supra notes 16-28 for a full discussion of this case.
39. Id. It is interesting to note that the same court found the issue of whether
the plaintiff could sue for prenatally inflicted injuries to be a threshold issue in
this case, when it had not even mentioned this issue in the Gay case.
40. Id. Two causes of action were available, one for survivorship which
awarded as general assets to the decedent's estate damages for the decedent's
pain and suffering as well as his medical and burial expenses, and one for
wrongful death which allowed recovery of only pecuniary loss suffered by the
next of kin due to the decedent's death. Id. at 156, 161 S.E.2d at 534.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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In Stetson, Justice Lake, joined by Justice Higgins, dissented
from the majority's finding the damages too speculative to allow a
cause of action to stand. Justice Lake cited Russell v. Windsor
Steamboat Co. 43 because of its similarity. The court in Russell
allowed recovery for the wrongful death of a five month old baby
after finding that the plaintiff could recover substantial damages
on the case as alleged in the complaint. Justice Lake pointed out
the Russell court allowed the action after admitting "[i]n the very
nature of things, a child five months old has no present earning
capacity, and has not reached a sufficient state of development to
furnish any indication of his probable earning capacity in the
future, other than the fact of being a healthy boy. This is all we
know of him, or ever can know."4 4 Justice Lake found these facts
indistinguishable from the ones in Stetson since the plaintiff had
pled the decedent had been healthy prior to the injury. Thus, the
dissent pointed to a rather significant weakness in the court's
damages analysis in both Stetson and Gay.4 5
The Stetson court again passed over the issue of whether a
viable fetus was a "person" under the Act, and, in fact, the court
never even mentioned the issue. It would have appeared that personhood was a threshold issue under the Act, as the court would
never have needed to decide whether a fetus could adequately
prove his pecuniary damages if it first found that a fetus was not a
"person" under the Act. If the fetus did not come within the statute, damages would be irrelevant.4 6 The Stetson court's silence on
this crucial issue left the door open for the legislature to rewrite
the wrongful death statute in such a way that would allow a fetus
a cause of action.

43. 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
44. Stetson, 274 N.C. at 146, 161 S.E.2d at 534 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Many of the states that have denied a cause of action for the wrongful
death of a fetus have done so on the basis of the court's interpretation of the
statute's use of the word "person" not to include a fetus. See, e.g., Stokes v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191
N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); see also Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to
Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn Children, 84
A.L.R.3d 411 (1978 & Supp. §§ 3(b) and 4(b) 1985), for a complete listing of those
jurisdictions which have so interpreted their state's wrongful death statute.
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C. 1969 Amendment to the Wrongful Death Act
In 1969, the North Carolina General Assembly moved to correct what it determined to be a flaw in the Wrongful Death Act.
The legislature enacted the following:
Whereas, human life is inherently valuable; and
Whereas, the present statute is so written and construed that
damages recoverable from a person who has caused death by a
wrongful act are effectually limited to such figure as can be calculated from the expected earnings of the deceased, which is far from
an adequate measure of the value of human life.4 7
This enactment allowed a wrongful death plaintiff to recover for
the following damages:
Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act; evidence of damages. (a) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incidence to the injury resulting in death.
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent.
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent.
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons
entitled to receive the damages recovered, including but not limited to compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected:
(i) Net income of the decedent,
(ii) Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, whether voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to
the damages recovered,
(iii) Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly
offices and advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the
damages recovered.
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he survived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the decedent through maliciousness, wilful or
wanton injury, or gross negligence.
4
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds .... s
These changes to the Act's damages section effectively overruled
Stetson and Gay regarding the types of damages recoverable for
wrongful death. With the change in the statute, the issue of
whether an action for wrongful death would lie for a fetus would
be soon revisited by the courts of North Carolina.
47. Chapter 215, Session Laws of 1969.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/2
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D. Cardwell v. Welch and Yow v. Nance
Cardwell v. Welch 49 was the first appellate case to revisit the
issue of whether a fetus could maintain a wrongful death action in
North Carolina. The plaintiff was a viable child of seven months
gestation who was delivered stillborn, allegedly because of injuries suffered by the mother in an automobile accident. 50 The trial
court held a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of section
28-173 of the North Carolina General Statutes and thus granted
defendant's motion to dismiss.5 1 Thus, the court of appeals in
Cardwell addressed the question the Supreme Court had man-

aged to avoid in Gay and Stetson - was a viable fetus a "person"
under the Wrongful Death Act?
The Cardwell court, after first noting the changes in the
wrongful death statute since Gay and Stetson and the resulting
need for a decision on the issue, stated the following:
It is, of course, apparent that to state the problem, as we have, in
terms of whether a viable unborn fetus is or is not a "person" is of
but slight assistance in arriving at a decision of the real problem
here presented, i.e., whether an action should be held to
52 lie under
the statute for the wrongful death of an unborn child.
The Cardwell court then proceeded to construe the statute to
exclude an unborn child from the meaning of "person", citing both
53
the plain language of the statute and practical considerations.
The court rejected the rationale of other jurisdictions, which
allowed recovery to a viable fetus, but did nothing to solve the
issue and that merely relocated the problem. 54 The Cardwell
court also stated a discernable cutoff point was needed between
the time of conception and live birth, and this approach had the
benefit of "providing at least some degree of certainty to an other49. 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382 (1975).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 391, 213 S.E.2d at 383.
52. Id. at 392, 213 S.E.2d at 383.
53. A close reading of the court's decision shows it arrived at a poor basis to

support such a complicated decision. See id. at 392, 213 S.E.2d at 383. To simply
say the drafters of the Act could have easily indicated they intended to include
the unborn within the ambit of the term by explicitly stating such intention, and
to then infer from the lack of such explicit wording regarding the unborn that the
drafters must have affirmatively meant to exclude the unborn from the statute,
was simply a statement, in this Author's view, of judicial opinion.
54. Id. at 393, 213 S.E.2d at 384.
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wise highly speculative situation."55 Thus, the court held the
word "person" as used in the wrongful death statute meant one
who has become recognized as a person by having been born
alive. 56 The Cardwell court, therefore, left the matter to the legislature to determine if a change in this interpretation was
57
necessary.
When Yow v. Nance58 came before the North Carolina Court
of Appeals, the court relied exclusively upon its prior decision in
Cardwell and summarily upheld that decision without any additional discussion of the issue. The facts of Yow were essentially
the same as those in Cardwell. A viable stillborn child was suing
for damages under the wrongful death statute, and the court of
appeals simply stated that "[flor the reason stated in [Cardwell],
the judgment [for the defendant] is affirmed." 59 The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to certify either case on appeal.6 °
E.

The Law at Present -

DiDonato v. Wortman

Twelve years after the court of appeals, in Cardwell and Yow,
held a viable fetus was not a "person" under the North Carolina
wrongful death statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court confronted the issue in DiDonato v. Wortman.6 ' In a four to three
decision, the DiDonato court overturned Cardwell and Yow and
held a viable unborn child does have a cause of action under the
wrongful death statute.
Similar to its predecessors, DiDonato involved a plaintiff
administrator of the estate of a deceased viable child who was
stillborn. The plaintiff alleged that the doctors providing prenatal
care for the mother were negligent in failing to diagnose the
mother's diabetes and in failing to deliver the child before he ran
55. Id. See Susan D. Crooks, Wrong Without a Remedy - North Carolinaand
the Wrongful Death of a Stillborn, 9 CAMPBELL L. Rev. 93 (1986) (providing a
discussion of why live birth provides no more certainty than viability on the issue
of when a cause of action should accrue).
56. Id. at 393, 213 S.E.2d at 384.
57. Id.
58. 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, discretionaryreview denied, 290 N.C.
312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976).
59. Id. at 420. The judgment being affirmed was the lower court's dismissal of
plaintiff's case upon defendant's Rule 12 motions. Id.
60. Yow v. Nance, 290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833, discretionaryreview denied,
290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976); Cardwell v. Welch, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d
623, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
61. 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
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out of oxygen. The plaintiff claimed damages under the Wrongful
Death Act. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's case, and the
court of appeals upheld the dismissal. The supreme court granted
certiorari for the first time on the issue of whether "N.C. Gen.
Stat. section 28A-18-2 6 2 allows recovery for the death of a viable
63
but unborn child."
The DiDonato court noted the court of appeals' decisions in
both Cardwell and Yow had gone undisturbed by the General
Assembly, but the court then warned of the dangers of inferring
legislative approval of appellate court decisions based on nothing
more than legislative silence.6 4 Accordingly, the court set up a
two-part inquiry upon which to decide the issue. This inquiry
involved an analysis of the words of the statute and the common
law principles governing its application, as well as the public policy bases of the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act, which are
contained in each part.6 5
1.

Statutory Construction of the Wrongful Death Act

Citing the language of the statue in full, the DiDonato court
found the wording of the statue to be ambiguous on the issue of
whether its language included a viable fetus within its meaning.
The Legislature's definition of "person," as described in N.C. Gen.
Stat. section 12-3(6), was of little assistance to the court in making
this determination.6 6 The court, therefore, turned to its decisions
in the area of prenatal injury and found "[i]t would be logical and
consistent with these decisions, and would further the policy of
deterring dangerous conduct that underlies them, to allow such
claims when the fetus does not survive."67
From that axiom, the DiDonato court stated it was unlikely
the legislature would desire to allow a fetus to recover for prenatal
injury but not for prenatal injury which leads to death.6" Moreover, the court added the legislature had made clear its desire to
62. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 28-173 and 28-174 were incorporated into one
statutory section, § 28A-18-2, without substantive change. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-18-2 (1993). See also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
63. 320 N.C. at 424, 358 S.E.2d at 490.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Section 12-3(6) states "[t]he word 'person' shall extend and be applied
to bodies politic and corporate, as well as to individuals, unless the context
clearly shows to the contrary...." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12-3(6) (i986).
67. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 437, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
68. Id.
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have the word "person" include those possessing "human life." 6 9
In light of this language, the DiDonato court found a viable fetus
is "undeniably alive and undeniably human" and is "by definition,
capable of life independent of its mother."70 The court found these
facts to be some evidence that a viable fetus was a person under
the statute and, while the language itself was inconclusive, the
case law and the wording of the amendments to the Act both
pointed toward acknowledging fetal personhood.
2. Common Law PrinciplesGoverning the Application of the
Statute
The DiDonato court explained the 1969 amendments to the
Wrongful Death Act largely had undercut the rationale of its decision in Gay,71 which had disallowed a wrongful death action for a
viable fetus on the basis that pecuniary damages for a fetus were
nothing more than mere speculation.72 Accordingly, Gay would
not be controlling in this case. Instead, the DiDonato court held:
[The] language of our wrongful death statute, its legislative history, and recognition of the statute's broadly remedial objectives
compel us to conclude that any uncertainty in the meaning of the
word "person" should be resolved in favor of permitting an action
to recover for the destruction of a viable fetus en ventre sa mere.73
69. Id. The preamble to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 is the same as that of the
1969 Act which states human life is inherently valuable and allowing recovery of
no more than pure pecuniary losses was far from an adequate measure for
human life.
70. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 427, 358 S.E.2d at 491. Furthermore, the court
found the purpose of the statute was to deter dangerous conduct and to provide a
means of recovery for the death of a human being that had not existed in the
common law. Wrongful death statutes in every state had overruled the common
law and the DiDonato court found the North Carolina General Assembly's
legislative purpose in enacting its wrongful death statute was based on "broadly
remedial objectives." Id.
71. Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
72. But see Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937). In Van
Beeck, Justice Cardozo opined:
Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of
the [common law rule of no liability]. It would be a misfortune if a
narrow or grudging process of construction were to exemplify and
perpetuate the very evils to be remedied. There are times when
uncertain words are to be brought into consistency and unity with a
legislative policy which is itself a source of law, a new generative
impulse transmitted to the legal system.
Id. at 350-351.
73. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 430, 358 S.E.2d at 492-93.
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With those words, a new cause of action was born.
III.

LIMITATION OF DAMAGES

Even though the North Carolina Supreme Court, in
DiDonato, moved forward in recognizing an unborn child's survivors had an action in law to recover for a fetus' wrongful death,
the court took yet another step backward by eliminating the largest potential area of damages recoverable. Harking back to the
language of Gay, which had been just overruled substantially, the
DiDonato court stated that section 28A-18-2 only permitted recovery for those damages not based on sheer speculation. 74 The court
held that the law of Gay on the issue of awarding income-based
damages to a stillborn child remained valid and, thus, the lost
income damages "normally available under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A18-2(b)(4)(a) cannot be recovered in an action. for the wrongful
death of a stillborn child." 75 The DiDonato court cited a New
Jersey case where the New Jersey Supreme Court held:
On the death of a very young child ... at least some facts can be

shown to aid in estimating damages as, for example, its mental
and physical condition. But... [i]t is virtually impossible to predict whether the unborn child, but for its death, would have been
capable of giving pecuniary benefit to its survivors.76
The DiDonato court then appeared to take judicial notice of the
fact that no proof could ever be provided, irrespective of the situation, to show an unborn child, immediately prior to death, possessed the ability to make a pecuniary contribution to his family.77
The court simply held as a matter of law that it would always be
impossible to prove with any degree of certainty that a stillborn
child could ever have contributed to his family financially, and
therefore, his family could not recover such damages under the
wrongful death act. In essence, the DiDonato court slammed the
door to rapidly developing technology that may in the near future
74. Id. at 430, 358 S.E.2d at 493.
75. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
76. Id. at 431, 358 S.E.2d at 493 (citing Graf v. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140, 144
(N.J. 1964)).
77. Id. at 431-32, 358 S.E. 2d at 494. In this Author's opinion the court was
clearly in error here. Specifically, there were numerous published studies at the
time of the DiDonato decision that could have been offered, along with factual
diagnostic studies of the fetus in question to prove the likelihood of such a child's
potential monetary contributions. The fact the court cites no medical authority
for its assumption of these facts only magnifies the dubious nature of such an
assumption.
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change the status of what the court held to be an incontrovertible
fact.
The DiDonato court next denied recovery of any damages for
loss of services, companionship, advice and the like, which were
normally available under N.C. Gen. Stat. sections 28A-182(b)(4)(b) and 28A-18-2(b)(4)(c). 78 To support its holding, the
court cited the same reasons used in support of its denial of pecuniary damages, specifically:
When a child is stillborn we simply cannot know anything about
its personality and other traits relevant to what kind of companion it might have been and what kind of services it might have
provided. An award of damages covering these kinds of losses
would necessarily be based on speculation rather than reason.79
The DiDonato court did allow, however, recovery of damages
for the pain and suffering of the fetus before death, 0 medical and
funeral expenses, as well as for punitive and nominal damages.8 "
Three justices registered dissents in the case. Justice Martin
concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Martin concurred
with the majority's finding that a viable fetus was a "person"
under the wrongful death statute, 2 but he dissented from the
majority's finding with respect to damages, stating "[t]he majority
correctly holds that a viable unborn fetus is a 'person' within the
meaning of the wrongful death statute, then inexplicably attempts
to cut away part of the statutory damages provided within the
statute. This the court cannot do."8 3 Justice Martin saw the fetal

plaintiff as no different from any other wrongful death plaintiff,
and thus he would have allowed the fetal plaintiff to recover such
78. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
79. Id.
80. Id. The court said it was not convinced the pain and suffering of a fetus
can ever be satisfactorily proved, but in light of current technology it could not
foreclose the possibility as a matter of law. Id. In this Author's opinion, it is clear
that should the issue come up on appeal, the court will closely scrutinize the
record for the weight of the medical evidence presented by both sides. On the
other hand, it is unclear why the court could not have made the same finding
with regard to pecuniary and loss of companionship damages.
81. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494. Lastly, the DiDonato court addressed the
issue of whether the parents of the deceased child could sue separately for their
alleged mental distress caused by the loss of the child. Id. In answering this
question the court held to allow punitive damages to be awarded in both actions
would require joining the parents' actions with the wrongful death action of the
child. Id.
82. Id. at 434-35, 358 S.E.2d at 495 (Martin, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 436, 358 S.E.2d at 496 (Martin, J., dissenting).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/2
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damages as were proved in accordance with the law.8 4 Further,
Justice Martin stated it was not for the court to bar the "plaintiff
from trying to prove all damages recoverable under the statute." 5
Justice Martin concluded this point by finding "[iut is not the prerogative of this court to usurp a legislative function by rewriting
the statute to change the rule of damages."8 6 He then went on to
dissent from the majority's rule requiring joinder of the parents
claims, saying this is better left to discretion of the trial judge.8 7
Justice Webb also wrote a dissenting opinion, which was
joined by Justice Mitchell. Justice Webb felt it constituted error
to allow a wrongful death action by a fetus where the legislature
had not clearly indicated that one should exist. Justice Webb
wrote that legislative silence was a helpful tool in DiDonato and
should not have been dismissed by the majority. In his opinion,
the legislature was surely aware of the court's decision in Gay v.
Taylor, when it revised the wrongful death statute in 1969, and
thus, the legislature easily could have defined "person" to include
an unborn child. The fact the legislature did not, Justice Webb
argued, should be taken as clear evidence of its intent not to
include the fetal plaintiff in this cause of action.8 8 Justice Webb
saw further error in the majority's restricting the types of damages allowed to the fetal plaintiff.8 9 Specifically Justice Webb
stated "If there are to be wrongful death claims for unborn persons, the plaintiffs should have whatever damages they may prove
under the Wrongful Death Act."9"
Ledford v. Martin
The first case to address the wrongful death of a fetus after
DiDonato was Ledford v. Martin.9 1 The plaintiff was an approximately thirty-four week old fetus that allegedly died as a result of
the negligence of the doctor in charge of his prenatal care. Without making any kind of finding as to the viability of the child, 92
the court of appeals simply cited the DiDonatocase and held that
A.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id at 437, 358 S.E.2d at 497.
87. Id. at 436, 358 S.E.2d at 496 (Webb, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 87 N.C. App. 88, 359 S.E.2d 505 (1987).
92. While by all medical standards this child was viable, such a determination
is generally left to the fact finder.
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on the facts alleged by the complaint, a cause of action existed for
the fetal plaintiff. The court never expanded or contracted the law
of DiDonato. It did, however, state that a physician has the same
duty to the fetal patient as to its mother, explaining that "[w]hen
an obstetrician agrees to take on a pregnant woman as a patient,
he actually acquires two patients: mother and baby."93 As
decided, Ledford left DiDonato wholly unaltered. The Ledford
case may, however, have import beyond the wrongful death arena
with regard to the status of a viable fetus as a "person" under various statutes.
B. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates
The first case to attempt to clarify DiDonato was Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A. 94 The plaintiffs
were the parents of a viable stillborn child who had. been
appointed administrators of their child's estate. Bringing the suit
in the name of the child, the plaintiffs alleged the doctors responsible for prenatal care were negligent in failing to properly treat
the mother's diabetic condition, and that such negligence wrongfully caused the death of the child.95 The complaint asked for both
punitive and compensatory damages under the Wrongful Death
Act. The suit was filed and later dismissed prior to the decision in
DiDonato.96

The main issue before the Johnson court was whether the
decedent had stated a cause of action under the Act. Stated
another way, could DiDonato, which clearly created a cause of
action under the Act for a viable fetus, be applied retroactively.
The Johnson court held there was no compelling reason why
DiDonato should not be applied retroactively. 97
The next issue for the Johnson court was whether the plaintiff was, in fact, a viable fetus at the time of death. The court
stated that if the pleadings in the case'disclosed "as a matter of
law that plaintiffs' intestate was not 'viable' under DiDonato, then
the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful death claim must be
93. 87 N.C. App. at 91, 359 S.E.2d at 507. Viability was not mentioned by the
court as a prerequisite to having this duty attach. Id.
94. 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 909 (1988).
95. Id. at 156, 365 S.E.2d at 910.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 159, 365 S.E.2d at 912, citing Cox v. Haworth, 304 N.C. 571, 284
S.E.2d 322 (1981) (holding decisions are presumed retroactive unless contrary
compelling reason).
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affirmed." 98 Noting the DiDonato'scourt language concerning the
characteristics of a viable fetus, the Johnson court further cited
the long-established common law definition of viability - a fetus'
capability to live independently of the mother.9 9 The court then
discussed the ambiguity surrounding DiDonato's attempted definition of viability and that DiDonato's"viable" fetus also included
a nonviable fetus as well.1 0 0 Accordingly, in an obvious attempt to
clear away such ambiguity created by DiDonato'sdefinition of a
viable fetus, the court of appeals held that the supreme court's
real intent was to use the common law definition of viability as
stated above.
The Johnson court went on to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth'01 where the Supreme Court held that the determination of a fetus' viability is a question of fact, not law. 10 2 Despite
the Danforth holding, the Johnson court found the complaint did
allege facts that would indicate that the defendants breached
their duty owed to the fetus while in utero given the fetus died at
forty weeks, a gestational age well beyond the twenty to twentysix weeks suggested by medical experts as the point viability
would begin.10 3 Accordingly, the court ruled the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as it alleged a breach of duty after
viability, a ruling which effectively avoided the issue of whether
the doctor owed a duty-to the nonviable fetus.' 0 4
Johnson provided a clear indication of how the court of
appeals was going to interpret the supreme court's definition of
viability as it concerns a wrongful death action. In Johnson, the
court established that a finding must first be made as to whether a
complaint sufficiently alleged a decedent fetal plaintiff was viable
at the time of death. The case further established the final determination of viability is one for the fact finder and in so holding,
98. Id.
99. Id. at 159, 365 S.E.2d at 913.
100. Id.
101. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
102. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 161, 265 S.E.2d at 914.
103. Id. See also supra note 5.
104. Id. For support, the Johnson court cited Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C.
103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985) (assuming duty to fetus arguendo) and Ledford v.
Martin, 87 N.C. App. 88, 359 S.E.2d 505 (1987) (holding physician owes duty of
care to both pregnant mother and fetus). Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 161, 265
S.E.2d at 914.
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the court of appeals also expressed its opinion that a nonviable
fetus cannot sue for wrongful death in North Carolina.
C.

Greer v. Parsons

Greer v. Parsons10 5 is the last case in North Carolina to
address the issue of a fetal wrongful death claim. The mother of
Kandy Greer, an eight and a half month old unborn child, sued as
the Administratrix of the baby's estate, alleging the defendant's
negligent operation of their automobile wrongfully caused the
death of the unborn child. 10 6 The parents had already settled
their claims with full releases before the suit was brought. The
complaint asked for punitive and compensatory damages. 10 7 The
issue before the Greer court was whether, under the Wrongful
Death Act, a fetus could be awarded punitive damages, and
whether the fetus' survivors could recover damages for the0 8loss of
the child's services, companionship, society, and the like.1
The Greer court held that under DiDonato, the plaintiff could
collect punitive damages, regardless of the fact that her parents
had already settled their claims, in essence ruling that the child's
claim was independent of those of the parents. The court stated
the only reason for the supreme court's requirement that a parent's tort claims be joined with the child's wrongful death claim
was to facilitate the fair litigation of multiple claims based on the
same event. In other words, the Greer court wanted to prevent a
double recovery. Where there was only one claim, however, joinder is irrelevant, reasoned the court, and DiDonato did nothing to
prevent the settlement of the parents claims apart from the
child's. 109
The Greer court next turned to the question of the ability of
the plaintiff's survivors to recover for the loss of the stillborn's
companionship, services, advice, society and the like. The Greer
court seemed to be convinced that DiDonato was wrong on this
point, but it was nonetheless forced to abide by the higher court's
decision. 110 The plaintiff in Greer had argued the Act expressly
authorized the recovery of damages for the loss of a child's society,
companionship, and the like, when proven, and it was not impossi105. 103 N.C. App. 463, 405 S.E.2d 921 (1991).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 466, 405 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 467, 405 S.E.2d at 924.
Id. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 924.
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ble to prove the nature and extent of the damages suffered.'1 1 The
court agreed with these contentions saying that "[t]he DiDonato
decision ...

cannot be reconciled with the 'basic principle of law

and equity that no man shall be permitted to take advantage of
his own wrong,'" as the decision allowed tortfeasors to escape liability for the parents' loss of the companionship and society of
their child. 1 12 The court further pointed out that the DiDonato
decision prevented the parents from trying to prove damages
expressly authorized under the Act.1 13 The Greer court found the
implication that damages for a child's lost companionship and
society depends entirely upon its personality, character, and other
traits is far too broad. In so finding the court opined:
Everyone who has been a parent - or been around parents with
young children - knows that normal parents have a unique and
treasured companionship with their young children; not because
of the particular characteristics or merits of the children, but
because of the needs of the parents to 114
perpetuate themselves and
the children's dependency upon them.
However, the Greer court acknowledged its obligation to follow the
precedent of DiDonato, and it thus affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiff's claims for these types of damages. While providing
some additional guidance as to the operation of the joinder
requirement, Greer did not, despite the logic of its reasoning,
change the law in this area.
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT NORTH CAROLINA LAW ON
WRONGFUL DEATH OF A FETUS

DiDonato v. Wortman1 5 is currently the law in North Caro-

lina as to how the Wrongful Death Act' 1 6 is to be interpreted when
the plaintiff is a stillborn child. According to DiDonato, a viable
unborn child, through its estate, is able to state a cause of action
under the Act for wrongful death.1 17 Accordingly, the fetus may
111. Id.
112. Id. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 924, quoting Garner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160,
147 S.E.2d 845 (1948).
113. Id.

114. Id. at 468, 405 S.E.2d at 924. The court's reasoning makes clear the
inherent fault of the supreme court's opinion in DiDonato regarding these types
of damages.
115. 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1994).
117. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995

21

190

Campbell
Law Review, Vol.
17, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2
CAMPBELL
LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:169

recover damages for pain and suffering,"" medical expenses," 9
funeral expenses, 120 and nominal and punitive damages. 12 1 The
fetus' survivors, however, may not recover pecuniary damages or
damages for the loss of the plaintiff's companionship, comfort, guidance, or the like.' 2 2 Any claim a parent may have against the
tortfeasor causing the plaintiff/child's death must be joined with
12 3
the wrongful death claim.
The supreme court's decision in DiDonato did not specifically
address the issue of viability, but it did explicitly use the words
"viable fetus" in making its holding. 12 4 The court of appeals tried
to clarify the definition of "viability" in the Johnson case, and held
that a nonviable fetus could not bring a cause of action under the
12 5
Wrongful Death Act.
On the issue of damages, Gay v. Taylor is still the applicable
law with respect to the speculative nature of a pecuniary damages
claim made by the survivors of a stillborn fetus. 126 DiDonato
explicitly overruled two prior decisions, Yow and Cardwell, on the
issue of whether a viable fetus is a "person" under the wrongful
death statute. 1 27 The court of appeals, in Greer, substantially
questioned the logic of the supreme court's denial of loss of society
damages to the fetal plaintiff making a wrongful death claim, but
1 28
it did not change the law in this area.

118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(2). Courts clearly will require hard
evidence on this issue, but no more than reasonable proof that the decedent
actually suffered pain before death as a direct result of the tortious act
complained of. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 431, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(1).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(3).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(6) & (5). For the statute of limitation on
punitive damages applicable to all wrongful death actions, see N.C. GEN. STAT. 153(4) (1983).
122. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 431, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
123. Id. at 433, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
124. Id. at 426, 358 S.E.2d at 493.

125. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A., 89 N.C. App.
154, 365 S.E.2d 909 (1988).

126. Gay v. Taylor, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
127. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
128. Greer v. Parsons, 103 N.C. App. 463, 405 S.E.2d 921 (1991).
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A.

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT LAW

Viability requirement

DiDonato not only left many questions unanswered, but it
raised some new issues as well. The major unanswered question
is whether a nonviable fetus is a "person" under the wrongful
death statute and, thus, is capable of stating a claim for wrongful
death. The court of appeals in both Yow' 2 9 and Cardwell'3 0 dealt
with the question of whether a clearly viable fetus was a "person"
under the Act. The DiDonato court also dealt with this question
and overruled the court of appeals' prior decisions, in Yow and
Cardwell, by making specific reference to the fact of the viability
of the plaintiff, and yet its holding only mentioned viable
fetuses.1 3 1 The DiDonato court did not, however, hold that a nonviable fetus was not a "person" under the Act, nor did it limit its
holding to the specific facts of that case. In fact, the DiDonato
court, in overturning the court of appeals' decisions in Yow and
Cardwell, noted that:
A viable fetus, whatever its legal status might be, is undeniably
alive and undeniably human. It is, by definition, capable of life
independent of its mother. A viable fetus is genetically complete
and can be taxonomically distinguished from non-human life
forms. Again, this is some evidence that a viable fetus is a person
under the wrongful death statute.1 " 2
As pointed out by the court of appeals in Johnson, a nonviable
fetus is also "undeniably alive and undeniably human." 3 3 It too is
"genetically complete" and can be "taxonomically distinguished
from non-human life forms."' 3 4 The only difference between the
viable and nonviable fetus is the former's ability to survive outside
the mother's womb. Thus, it is unclear if the Johnson court found
this singular difference compelling enough to include the viable
fetus in the statute and to exclude the nonviable fetus from the
same, or if the court even considered the differences between the
two. Given the fact that both Gay and Yow cannot, after
DiDonato, be claimed to decide the issue of whether a nonviable
129. Yow v. Nance, 29 N.C. App. 414, 224 S.E.2d 242, discretionary review
denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976).
130. Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 340, 213 S.E. 382 (1975).
131. See DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
132. Id. at 427-28, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
133. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 154, 365 S.E.2d at 912-13.
134. Id.
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fetus is a "person" under the statute, 135 the question of a nonviable fetus' legal status under the Wrongful Death Act is very
much an undecided issue at the supreme court level. For now,
however, it is clear the court of appeals has ruled that a nonviable
13 6
fetus may not sue under the Wrongful Death Act.
In this Author's opinion, to cut off the wrongful death cause of
action at viability seems an unjust and illogical standard. The
majority of states allowing causes of action for fetal plaintiffs
under their wrongful death statutes have imposed the viability
requirement, yet there is little to recommend such a standard.
The main problem with the viability requirement is that it is
"impossible of practical application" 137 because viability is "a relative matter which depends upon the period of gestation, the health
and hereditary makeup of the fetus, the characteristics of the
mother, and the availability and quality of prenatal medical
care."138 Due to the variance of viability with each individual
pregnancy, "its use as a criterion in evaluating potential recovery
for the wrongful death of a fetus has been '[characterized as a
'nebulous circumstance' upon which to base the determination of
independent existence... and an arbitrary criterion which seems
'an unnecessary and inappropriate element of recovery.' "1 3 9 Simply put, proving viability will be very difficult in any case and will
be as speculative a proposition as proving the loss of society damages the supreme court disallowed in DiDonato. As time passes,
advances in medical technology will make determination of viability even more complex.
At present, viability generally is agreed to occur at approximately twenty to twenty-six weeks of gestation. 40 Medical
135. This fact coupled with the fact that the supreme court held in Stetson v.
Easterling that a child born alive can recover for prenatally inflicted injuries
regardless of viability. See Stetson, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
136. See Johnson, 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 904.
137. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960).
138. Id. (quoting Jim Hutcherson, Note, TORT LAW - North Carolina
Recognizes a Cause of Action for the Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus DiDonato v.Wortman, 23 WAKE FoREST L. R.v. 849, 867-68 (1988) (citations
omitted)).
139. Id. (quoting Karen R. Osborne, Comment, Torts, The Right of Recovery for
the Tortious Death of the Unborn, 27 How. L.J. 1649, 1679 (1984) (citations
omitted)).
140. See Susan D. Crooks, Comment, Wrong Without a Remedy - North
Carolina and the Wrongful Death of a Stillborn, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 93, 124
(1986); see also supra note 5.
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research is in progress, however, that would enable doctors to
remove a child from it's mother's womb at any point after conception and transfer it to another womb, where it would continue to
thrive until birth. Ectogenesis researchers are well on the way to
conceiving and bringing to maturity human fetuses that have
never lived inside a human body. 41 These types of medical
advances will make viability a non-factor in the spectrum of fetal
development leaving the viability requirement obsolete.
In terms of equity, the viability requirement is inherently
unjust. The wrong the statute was enacted to remedy is the
wrongful killing of a "person," which now includes a viable fetus.
If it is wrong to kill a viable child, then why is not just as wrong to
kill a nonviable child? As the DiDonato court recognized, the real
parties in interest in the wrongful death of an unborn child are
the parents. 142 Thus, "[t]o condition a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a fetus on viability does nothing to alleviate the
unfairness to parents who lose their child due to the actions of the
tortfeasor who inflicted the fatal injury before the fetus was viable."1 43 Moreover, by denying recovery prior to viability, the
court's standard may lead to preclusion of the worthiest
claimants.
The most crucial period of fetal development is the first trimester, which is always before viability.'" During this period,
the developing child is most vulnerable to outside influences
which can cause congenital defects and even death. Injury from
poor or negligent prenatal medical care, direct physical contact
with the mother, drug side effects, etc., is likely to have the greatest effect during this period. Thus, it is more likely the child will
die from such causes before reaching viability than if such injury
was inflicted after viability. 145 If an unborn child is a "person"
under the Wrongful Death Act, surely the legislature did not
intend such inequitable application of the statute.
There is no logically compelling argument to support the
imposition of a viability requirement on an action for wrongful
death. As already discussed, such a requirement is not more fair
141. Michael Kirby, Medical Technology and New Frontiers of Family Law,
LEGAL ISSUES IN HuMAN REPRODUCTION 3, 5 (Sheila McLean ed., 1989).

142. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 423, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
143. See supra note 110.
144. Harry Sarkis Cherken, Jr., Note, Recovery for Wrongful Death of a
Stillborn Examined, 21 ViLL. L. REV. 994, 1003 (1976).
145. Id.
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than allowing recovery from conception on - to the plaintiff or to
the defendant. Damages for the death of a nonviable child, especially under the current limitations, are no more speculative than
for the viable plaintiff. Certainty as to when the cause of action
actually accrues increases by a thousand percent when it accrues
at conception rather than viability. If there is a fetus to kill, then
there is an action for wrongful death. Additionally, allowing a
cause of action from conception onward also eliminates the need to
revisit the issue as medical technology advances.
The viability requirement should not be imposed on an action
for wrongful death, and the court of appeals should be reversed on
this issue. It remains to be seen whether the supreme court will
clarify its intentions on this issue as stated in the DiDonato case.
B.

Fetus as a Person

Among the questions raised by the court's language in
DiDonato is the effect that ruling will have on other areas of law
concerning the fetus. The supreme court has held as a matter of
law that a viable fetus is a "person" as that term is used in the
wrongful death statute. 1 46 It has further stated in reaching that
holding that the legal basis upon which it was based points
"toward acknowledging fetal personhood," without limiting that
statement to the Wrongful Death Act.' 4 7 In interpreting the word
"person," the DiDonato court concluded the language of the statute, its legislative history, and its broad remedial purpose all compelled the conclusion that any uncertainty as to the meaning of
the term should be resolved in
favor of permitting a wrongful
14
death action by a viable fetus. 1
A human fetus, regardless of viability, is not a person under
the North Carolina Constitution's Article I, sections 1 and 19.1"9
This fact, however, clearly does not prohibit the legislature or the
courts from deeming a human fetus a "person" under a particular
statute that was enacted to accomplish a constitutionally acceptable purpose. The language of the DiDonato decision simply adds
support to the position that a fetus, for the purposes of tort law at
the very least, should be considered a "person" in every legal
sense.' 50 The difficulty of legally recognizing a fetus as a person
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 428, 358 S.E.2d at 490.
Id. at 423, 358 S.E.2d at 491-92.
Id. at 430, 358 S.E.2d at 493.
Stain v. State, 302 N.C. 357,359, 275 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981).
DiDonato, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/2

26

1995]

Hartsoe: Person or Thing - In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: a Sur
LEGAL STATUS OF A FETUS

195

in one context and not doing so in another, is discussed in further
detail below. The type of language used in DiDonato does seem to
indicate a trend towards recognition of the unborn child as a member of society capable of possessing independent rights. 151
C. Pain and Suffering Damages
Another question raised by the DiDonato decision is the level
of proof necessary to meet the court's satisfaction on the issue of
damages for the pain and suffering of the fetal plaintiff. The
DiDonato court gave little or minimal guidance on this issue when
it said it was not convinced that one could ever satisfactorily prove
a fetus had suffered pain prior to its death in utero, but at it would
allow plaintiffs to go ahead and try anyway. 152 What is a trial
judge to do with this kind of standard? Did the DiDonato court
mean to setup a legal presumption that such damages were too
uncertain to award and a standard that could be rebutted only by
competent evidence on the issue? The court's language is certainly susceptible to such an interpretation. If so, what level of
proof would be needed to overcome the presumption - clear and
convincing evidence or merely some evidence that would ostensibly meet the plaintiff's production burden? The DiDonato court
further muddies the water by saying that such damages can be
had if they can be "reasonably established," 53 yet there appears
to be no determinative standard. The medical standard for empirical proof of these damages may greatly differ from the legal standard set up in the mind of the trial judge. This confusion prevents
a plaintiff from knowing how much proof she should present to the
court in order to have her claim for such damages allowed.
Finally, the DiDonato court provides no legal framework to decide
that such damages are too speculative as a matter of law. None of
the past supreme courts or court of appeals decisions that have
held damages to be too speculative under the Wrongful Death Act
logically describe what criterion should be used to in deciding the
issue.
In the wrongful death context, it is thus difficult to know how
successful a fetal plaintiff will be in collecting pain and suffering
damages.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 194.
153. Id.
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Pecuniary Loss, Loss of Society, Companionship,Services,
Advice and the Like

The court of appeals, along with legal scholars and commentators, have called into question the validity of the court's rationale
in DiDonato regarding loss of society damages,'
provided for in
sections 28A-18-2(b)(4)(a)-(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes. While North Carolina is not alone in denying such damages
in the case of the wrongful death of a stillborn fetus, 1 55 the court's
decision to do so seems to fly in the face of the clear legislative
intent and plain language of the Wrongful Death Act.
American courts that have addressed the issue of loss of society and pecuniary damages for the death of a stillborn child have
taken essentially three approaches to the issue. 1 56 The first is to
make little or no distinction between a viable unborn child and
one born alive, and the rules regarding each are the same. Following this approach, a Connecticut Superior Court reasoned that
because there was no right to recover loss of society damages for
the death of a child born alive, there also could be no such recovery in an action involving a viable unborn child.15 7 The Idaho
Supreme Court took the same approach, but arrived at a different
conclusion. The court held that where loss of society damages
were available for the wrongful death of a child born alive, they
were also recoverable for the death of a fetus. 5 8
The second approach is to focus on whether there has in fact
been any loss of society or pecuniary loss when the fetus dies.
Under this view, the California Supreme Court dismissed a claim
for loss society damages involving a stillborn fetus, holding "parents of a stillborn fetus have never known more than a mysterious
presence dimly sensed by random movements in the womb," and
that consequently, "the rich experiences upon which a meaningful
parent-child relationship is built . . . do not begin until the
154. For convenience sake, all the damages provided for under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-18-2(b)(4)(b) & (c) will be collectively referred to as "loss of society
damages."
155. See Shattuck v. Gulliver, 481 A.2d 1110 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); Justis v.
Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977); Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987).
156. See Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn,

13 J.

LEG. MED.

99 (Mar. 1992).

157. See Shattuck v. Gulliver, 481 A.2d 1110 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
158. See Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982).
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moment of birth."15 9 The Illinois Court of Appeals also employed
this view in saying that while parents may have affection for the
unborn child, no recovery would be allowed until after live birth
because the child could not be said to have returned that affection
160
until that point.
The third approach in dealing with the issue of damages is
that seen in DiDonato. The focus is on the speculative nature of
such damages, and the increased uncertainty of their existence
engendered by the unborn status of the child. While the Illinois
Court of Appeals has also voiced this concern, it upheld such damages on different grounds. 16 1 As discussed above, the Greer court
found the DiDonato court's reasoning behind denying such damages to the survivors of the wrongfully killed fetus to be flawed.' 6 2
The point is one well taken.
E.

DiDonato vitiates the legislative purpose of the 1969 changes
to the Act.

Unlike many wrongful death statutes in other American
jurisdictions, North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act clearly delineates the types of damages that can be recovered. Among these are
compensation for the loss of services, protection, care and assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices,
and advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages
159. Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 133 (Cal. 1977). The California court
also denied any cause of action for wrongful death-of a fetus in this case.
160. Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). It would appear
that neither the members of the California Supreme Court nor the members of
the Illinois Court of Appeals have ever had children of their own. A one day old
baby does not "return the affection" of its parents, and it is patently ridiculous to
say that the mother carrying an eight month fetus has little more attachment to
her child than that received from feeling "random movements in the womb."
Further, it is an abuse of judicial authority to make such factual findings on
issues of public policy without support for these conclusions either in the record
or in the realm of judicial notice. In fact, the Illinois Court of Appeals later
refused to rule as a matter of law that society was not in fact exchanged in the
months prior to birth, and thus left the matter open to reasonable proof to be
ruled on by the fact finder. See Seef v. Sitkus, 562 N.E.2d. 606 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990).
161. Smith v. Mercy Hosp. & Medical Center, 560 N.E.2d 1164 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990). The court noted the speculative nature of loss of society damages in the
case of a stillborn fetus, but found that because such damages were presumed in
a case involving a newborn child, the same presumption should exist in the case
of the unborn child as well. Id. at 1173.
162. See Greer v. Parsons, 103 N.C. App. 463, 405 S.E.2d 921 (1991).
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recovered. 1 6 3 Such damages were not recoverable before 1969,

when the legislature found that:
WHEREAS, human life is inherently valuable; and
WHEREAS, the present statute is so written and construed that
damages recoverable from a person who has caused death by a
wrongful act are effectually limited to such figure as can be calculated from the expected earnings of the deceased, which is far from
an adequate measure of the value of human life .... 164
Thus, the legislature has spoken to change the old rule of valuing
human life strictly by the amount of money one was capable of
making into a rule that allows the jury to place a monetary value
on the multiplicity of intangible damages that are often suffered
when someone wrongfully ends the life of another human being.
DiDonato's denial of loss of society and pecuniary damages
turns this legislative purpose on its ear. It allows all classes of
persons to recover for such damages, except for an unborn child.
Allowing recovery by the survivors of the child who is born alive
but dies within minutes of birth from prenatally inflicted injuries
cannot be logically reconciled with denying the same recovery to
the survivors of the child who dies from the same injuries only
minutes before he was to be delivered. This point is illustrated by
the court's decision in Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co. 16 5 An

action for the wrongful death of a five month old child (born alive),
the court addressed "the sole question of whether more than nominal damages are recoverable for the negligent killing of an infant
incapable of earning anything, without direct evidence of pecuniary damage other than sex, age and condition of health of the
deceased. 16 6 The court's opinion makes almost exactly the same
observation regarding the five month old child in that case as it
did about the stillborn plaintiff in DiDonato:
In the very nature of things a child [five] months old has no present earning capacity, and has not reached a sufficient state of
development to furnish any indication of his probable earning
capacity in the future, other than the fact of being
a healthy boy.
16 7
This is all we know of him or ever can know.
163.
164.
165.
166.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4)(b) & (c) (Supp. 1994).
1969 N. C. SEssION LAWS, Chapter 215, S.B. 95 (emphasis added).
126 N.C. 775, 36 S.E. 191 (1900).
Id. at 778, 36 S.E. at 191.

167. Id. Compare this to the court's justification for not allowing pecuniary
damages in the case of a viable stillborn child in DiDonato,about which evidence
had been introduced that the fetus was healthy prior to the infliction of the
prenatal injury which caused its death: "When a child is stillborn we can know
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/2
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Despite this observation, however, the court in Russell held that:
We see no distinction in the law, nor reason for distinction,
between the death of a child and of an adult. The measure of damages is the same, but we frankly admit that the difficulty of its
application is greatly increased in the case of an infant. Still, the
jury must do the best they can, taking into consideration all the
circumstances surrounding the life that is lost, and relying upon
their common knowledge and common sense to determine the
weight and effect of the evidence . . . we would be reluctant to

admit that a human life, however lowly or feeble, had no value...
Upon the greater and better weight of authority, as well as our
own convictions of natural justice and of public policy, we are constrained to hold that68the plaintiff can recover substantial damages
in the case at bar.'
Cannot the same be said of a fetus who is a legal "person," thus
having equal status with the five month old plaintiff in Russell?
The legislature was concerned with properly valuing human
life in compensating the survivors for a terrible loss caused by
another's wrongful act. Can anyone really be so heartless to say
that a mother who has carried a child for months, felt its movements in her body, named it, prepared a nursery for it, shopped
endlessly for just the right shade of crib bumpers and a matching
mobile and shared the excitement of the expectation of motherhood with her family and friends - has lost nothing when another
tortiously causes her child to die before it is born? While the
mother may bring her own action for emotional distress, the purpose of the wrongful death statute in providing for such damages
is wholly defeated by the court's arbitrary decision.
Wrongful death statutes were enacted to change the harsh
and illogical common law whereon it was "cheaper to kill one's victim than to merely injure him."16 9 The DiDonatocourt recognized

that "[i]n the case of a stillborn fetus, the beneficiaries of a wrongful death action will necessarily be the child's parents ... -170 it
also recognized that in a wrongful death action those parents are
seeking "compensation for the complete loss of, rather than mere
nothing about its intelligence, abilities, interests and other factors relevant to
the monetary contribution it might - or might not - someday have made to the
beneficiaries in a wrongful death action." DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 431, 358 S.E.2d
at 494.
168. Russell, 126 N.C. at 780-83, 36 S.E. at 192.
169. Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, 13
J. LEG. MED. 99 (Mar. 1992).
170. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 426, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
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injury to, their offspring." 17 1 Yet, when the court held that an
action could be had for prenatal injuries in Stetson v. Easterling,172 it said nothing of limiting the same type of damages in
any way. Thus, a parent who's child is severely injured in utero, is
born alive, and then lives for years in a constant vegetative state
can collect damages for loss of society, companionship, advice, and
the like, while the parent whose child dies from similar injuries
before he is born cannot collect any damages whatsoever for the
same loss. It seems reasonable to say that the child who is alive,
but comatose, provides no more companionship than the child that
was never born, nor can a court know anything about the comatose child's "personality and other traits relevant to what kind of
companion it might have been and what type of services it might
have provided." 173 The result is the same paradox the wrongful
death statute was enacted to alleviate in the first place - meaning it still benefits the tort feasor to kill the fetus rather than to
simply maim it. These same arguments have equal application
with regard to pecuniary damages as well.
Finally, the court's decision severely compromises the statute's "broadly remedial objectives"1 74 when it restricts both pecuniary and loss of society damages. Absent a case where punitive
damages may come into play, the only damages to be recovered for
the wrongful death of a fetus are medical and funeral expenses,
pain and suffering, and nominal damages. 175 Such damages are
vastly inadequate to compensate the estate of a dead child's right
to life, who has his right to life wrongfully taken away by the carelessness of another. Given the preamble to the Wrongful Death
Act, it is difficult to believe that the legislature would place such a
low value on the human life of anyone recognized as a "person" by
the same statute. This is exactly what the court has done.
F.

DiDonato provides no way of changing the law as technology
changes the quality of available evidence

DiDonato's total prohibition of loss of society and pecuniary
damages effectively restricts the law's further growth. It is a fact
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 427, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
Id. at 430, 358 S.E.2d at 493.
Even these damages, probably the greatest in terms of amount of the

remaining damages allowed, are going to be very difficult to collect under the
court's language in DiDonato. Id.
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of the modern world that technology is progressing at an almost
geometric rate, especially in the area of reproductive and prenatal
medicine. While the DiDonato court never even mentioned the
technology available at the time of the decision, a plaintiff in all
likelihood will be able to produce, as technology progresses, sound
evidence of a baby's likely personality, physical makeup at birth
and as an adult, intelligence, predilection to disease, and the like.
As the law stands now, no matter how much of this evidence
becomes available, it cannot aid a plaintiff in recovering damages
for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. Certainly the court can
revisit the issue at a later time, but there is no guarantee that it
will. In the meantime, many plaintiffs will go without compensation for losses which are provable.
G. Denying loss of society and pecuniary damages based on
their speculative nature alone is not logically sound
The mainstay of the court's position in refusing to allow loss
of society and pecuniary damages is that such damages are too
speculative in nature. Because one cannot know the "personality
and other traits relevant to what kind of companion" an unborn
child would have been and "what kind of services" he may have
provided, or how intelligent he may been, one cannot take a reasoned route to arrive at an appropriate assessment of these types
of damages. 176 First, the court never says what "other traits"
would be relevant to such a determination. Thus it is difficult to
know if one could make a reasoned finding as to such traits or not.
Further, pecuniary, loss of society, and pain and suffering damages are all speculative in nature, according to the court, yet all
wrongful death claims under the Act have elements of damages
that are entirely speculative. Accordingly, the speculative nature
of loss of society and pecuniary damages for a stillborn child
proves an illogical reason for their denial. In fact, of these three
types of damages, pain and suffering damages would be the most
speculative of all as there really is no way of quantitatively proving the degree of pain suffered by a fetus; but surprisingly, of
these three, pain and suffering damages are the only damages
that the court has left available to the fetal plaintiff.
The crux of the court's reasoning on this issue is that because
one cannot know anything about the intangible nature of a fetus,
his personality, likes and dislikes, temperament, work ethic, and
176. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
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the like, pecuniary and loss of society damages are even more
speculative than in the usual case. The court, however, provides
no support for this arbitrary finding, and it is surely not an issue
of which the court can take judicial notice. The court also fails to
look to precedent on the issue of speculative damages, which
would have revealed its position in DiDonato as inconsistent with
its past jurisprudence.
The court has held that some speculation in the calculation of
damages cannot preclude damages altogether, and that:
The present monetary value of the decedent... will usually defy
any precise mathematical computation. Therefore, the assessment of damages must, to a large extent, be left to the good sense
and fair judgment of the jury - subject, of course, to the discretionary power of the judge to set its verdict77 value aside when, in
his opinion, equity and justice so require.'
The court also stated that "North Carolina cases dealing with a
spouse's loss of consortium exhibit courts' increasing willingness
and confidence to let juries assess damages having a somewhat
intangible basis."1 78 Loss of consortium has been defined by the
supreme court as service, society, companionship, sexual gratification, and affection. 1 79 The court in Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham
Memorial Hospital held these types of damages were not too
remote to serve as the basis of a loss of consortium action.' s0
While it is true a spouse can offer evidence of their partner's past
conduct, there is no reason why the estate of a stillborn child cannot introduce evidence of the unborn's health before death, as well
as of their general family background, leaving the task of inferring
the relative value and extent of services and companionship the
child would have provided to his parents to the jury.
DiDonato prevents the estate from even trying to prove such
damages. The court of appeals in Greer v. Parsons,'' questioning
177. Brown v. Moore, 286 N.C. 664, 673, 213 S.E.2d. 342, 348-49 (1975).
178. Christopher P. Edwards, Survey of Developments in North CarolinaLaw,
1987: A DiDonato v. Wortman and Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus in North
Carolina:The Case Against UnreasonablyRestricting Damages, 66 N.C. L. REv.
1291 (1988) (citing Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295,
266 S.E.2d 818 (1980)); Goble v. Helms, 64 N.C. App. 439, 307 S.E.2d 807 (1983),
discretionary review denied, 310 N.C. 625, 315 S.E.2d 690 (1984).

179. Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d
818 (1980).
180. Id.
181. 103 N.C. App. 463, 405 S.E.2d 921 (1991).
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the validity of the DiDonato rationale for denying loss of society
damages, noted that:
While the companionship and associations that an adult child has
with its parents does depend to some extent upon its character,
personality and other traits, kinship is enduring and a parent's
bond with its offspring does not vanish when the child's personality becomes displeasing or its character disappointing. Thus, for a
jury to conclude that any normal parent would have enjoyed cuddling, looking after, playing with and training his or her child
regardless of its characteristics would not be "sheer speculation";
instead, it would be a rational determination based upon their
knowledge of human experience and the law of probabilities. Nor
does the opinion take into account that the life-long experiences
and insights of jurors accompany them into the box, and that they
would know without proof that children bring sorrow and anxiety
the loss of
as well as joy to their parents and would likely appraise
2
accordingly.'1
companionship
and
society
child's
any
The court in Greer took from the jury the ability to hear evidence
on the issue of loss of society and pecuniary damages, and refused
to allow it to decide whether such damages had been sufficiently
proven in the specific case at hand. The court substituted its will
for that of the legislature, and in so doing, it acted contrary to the
legislative purposes of the Wrongful Death Act. Because its position is neither supported by logic nor the law, it should be
changed.
H.

Alternatives to the current law on pecuniary and loss of
society damages for the stillborn child

One possible alternative to prohibiting recovery for pecuniary
and loss of society damages is to establish a legal presumption
that these damages exist whenever wrongful death is proven. Illinois is a jurisdiction with such a rule. In Jones v. Karraker,8 3 the
Illinois Supreme Court discussed this presumption of pecuniary
loss in wrongful death cases involving viable fetuses.1 8 4 Pecuniary damages in that case included loss of society damages as well.
Using such a system would automatically give plaintiffs a recovery unless the defendant could offer evidence to rebut the presumption that some lesser judgment should be rendered. If
damages in excess of the presumed amount can be proven by com182. Id. at 468-69, 405 S.E.2d at 924-25.
183. 457 N.E.2d 23, 24-25 (Ill. 1983).
184. Id.
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petent evidence, a jury may award such amounts. Judges can
then assess whether the proof is sufficient to justify an excess
award. Such an alternative would meet the need for some modicum of consistency in awarding such damages. Speculation would
then virtually disappear from the process, accomplishing the
remedial purposes of the statute. Another alternative would be to
legislate a statutory minimum award of such damages in any case
where the plaintiff prevails in a wrongful death claim for a stillborn fetus."8 5 Both of these proposed alternatives have the advantage of eliminating speculation and of guaranteeing at least some
significant recovery for the successful plaintiff.
A third possible approach would be to place a cap on the
amount of damages that could be awarded under these catagories.
The plaintiff would have the same burden to prove his damages as
in any other wrongful death case, but the jury would be restricted
from making a large award driven more by emotion than evidence,
and the judge would have some guidance as to relative values of
cases in view of the cap. Yet another approach would be to amend
the statute to specifically include the unborn fetus 18 6 and to overrule DiDonato. This would leave no question as to the types of
damages that would be available to this class of plaintiff, and the
courts, as well as plaintiffs, would have clear direction on the
issue. Such an approach would also rope in activist courts.
The most obvious alternative is to simply let the process work
as it does in every other wrongful death claim. The plaintiff will
bear the burden of bringing evidence before the jury that will
prove that pecuniary and loss of society damages were actually
suffered in a particular case. Juries and courts can "look to specific
known factors in assessing the compensable loss. " 187 Such factors
may include:
(1) the state of pregnancy at which stillbirth occurs; (2) the medical history of the mother with respect to previous childbirth; (3)
the number of children the couple presently has; (4) whether the
mother used artificial means to induce pregnancy, i.e., fertility
drugs; (5) the probability of the pregnancy going to full term; (6)
185. See Edwards, supra note 178. The statute should probably apply to all
persons under a stated age recognized by the Act to have a cause of action for
wrongful death. This would obstensibly remove the uncertainty from all cases
where the evidence by which to calculate damages is limited by the age and
experience of the decedent.
186. Such amendment could also speak to whether the Act is to cover the
nonviable fetus as well.
187. See Meadows, supra note 156.
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any prior history of miscarriage; (7) prenatal care of the stillborn
child; and (8) parental preparation for the forthcoming child, i.e.,
house additions, baby crib, and any1 8other
indicia of the degree of
8
expectation exuded by the parents.
If the jury award is contrary to the evidence produced, the judge
has the discretion either to set the verdict aside, make an alternative award, or to deny such damages altogether. But where there
is competent evidence, a deserving plaintiff will be allowed to
recover those damages the legislature clearly intended for him to
recover.
VI.

A.

PRENATAL INJURY

HistoricalBackground

Traditionally, a child who was born alive could not recover for
prenatally inflicted injuries. The unborn child was viewed to be a
part of the mother, and therefore, had no separate existence until
live birth.1 8 9 The general theory of law disallowing a fetus to
recover was expressed in the landmark case of Dietrich v. Northampton'910 in 1884. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the court's opinion in a case involving a child who died shortly after birth due to
prenatal injuries. Justice Holmes opined that an unborn child
was still a part of the mother and was not a separate being in its
own right. Thus, any injury suffered by the unborn child was
actually an injury to the mother for which she could maintain a
cause of action to recover for damages.1 9 ' This remained the prevailing law in the United States for over sixty years.
The most common reasons given for denying recovery for prenatal injuries were: (1) the unborn child was was part of the
mother, and thus not a "person" or legally recognized entity capable of possessing legal rights; (2) stare decisis; (3) lack of precedent; (4) the difficulty in proving causation in such cases; and
finally (5) the fear of fraud.- 92 These rationales did not go without
criticism, however; finally, the Federal District Court for the Dis188. Id. (citing Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019, 1030-31 n.15 (La. Ct. App.
1980), aff'd, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. Ct. App. 1981)).
189. Dawn E. Johnson, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with,
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95
YALE L.J. 599, 601 (1986).
190. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
191. Id. at 17.
192. Beth D. Osowski, Note, The Need for Logic and Consistency in Fetal
Rights, 68 N.D. L. R.v. 171, 173 (1992).
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trict of Columbia denied the logic of the rule and held a child who
was born alive could bring an action for prenatally inflicted injuries. 19' In the 1946 case of Bonbrest v. Kotz,' 94 the court
examined a medical malpractice case wherein an infant sought
recovery for injuries she alleged were sustained as a result of her
doctor's negligence in delivering her.195 The court distinguished
Bonbrest from Dietrich on the basis Dietrich had not involved a
direct injury to a viable child. 1 96 The court then asserted that
because the plaintiff was a viable fetus at the time the injuries
were suffered, she was by definition a separate entity from her
mother.1 97 Accordingly, the court found that the infant's enjoyment of life was "sacrosanct" and "inherent" and recognized her
independent right to maintain a cause of action for prenatal
injuries.

198

Bonbrest was the ripple which started a tidal wave of shifting
opinion in this area of the law, resulting in the "most spectacular
abrupt reversal of a well-settled rule in the whole history of
torts."199 At present, all American states, including20 0North Carolina recognize a cause of action for prenatal injury.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 142.

199. WILLM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 336 (4th ed.
1971).
200. See Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65
F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1973); Scott v.
McPheeters, 92 P.2d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
118 A.2d 633 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1955); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128
A.2d 557 (Del. 1956); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 65 S.E.2d 909 (Ga.
1951); Rodriquez v. Patti, 114 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1953); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp.
56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962); Orange v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d
352 (La. Ct. App. 1923); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951); Keyes
v. Construction Service, Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960); Womack v. Buckhorn,
187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.
1949); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954); Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d
577 (Mo. 1953); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969); Bennett v. Hymers, 147
A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960); Woods v.
Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d
425 (1966); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Co., 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949);
Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291 P.2d 225 (Or. 1955); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa.
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B. North CarolinaLaw
The first indication that the rule in North Carolina would be
to recognize a cause of action for prenatal injury was given in Gay
v. Thompson.2 ' While the supreme court denied a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a viable fetus, it stated in dicta: "Since
the child must carry the burden of infirmity that results from
another's tortious act, it is only natural justice that it, if born
alive, be allowed to maintain an action on the ground of actionable
negligence. "202
The issue remained dormant until the 1968 case of Stetson v.

Easterling.2° 3 In Stetson, the court formally recognized a viable
fetus which had suffered prenatal injuries could recover damages
for such injuries if born alive.204
The Stetson court examined the alleged wrongful death of a
viable fetus. To determine if there was a cause of action, the court
first addressed the threshold issue of whether the plaintiff could
have sued the defendant for his death-causing injuries had he

lived.20 5 An affirmative answer was required by the wrongful
death statute before such an action could be maintained.
The court noted this was a question of first impression in this
jurisdiction, confirming that it had not actually held such an
action existed in Gay v. Thompson.206 Citing briefly to cases and
treatises listing the In]umerous decisions, texts and Law Review
articles" which articulated the majority rule of allowing recovery
for prenatal injury, the court quoted the language from Gay v.
Thompson 20 7 and held this statement was adopted as authorative
in this jurisdiction.20° No elaboration accompanied this declaration. Furthermore, the question of whether the plaintiff had to be
1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966); Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d
790 (S.C. 1960); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Service, Inc., 358 S.W.2d 471
(Tenn. 1962); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967);

Seattle First Nat. Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1962); Kwaterski v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1968).
201. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966). See supra notes 16-28 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Gay.

202. Gay, 266 N.C. at 339, 146 S.E.2d at 429.
203. 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968). See supra notes 29-46 and
accompanying text for discussion of this case.

204. Stetson, 274 N.C. at 156, 161 S.E.2d at 534.
205.
206.
207.
208.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 was the statutory cite in 1968.
Stetson, 274 N.C. at 156, 161 S.E.2d at 534.
Id. See supra text accompanying note 202.
Stetson, 274 N.C. at 155, 161 S.E.2d at 533-34.
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viable at the time the injuries occurred in order to state a cause of
action remained unanswered.
Since Stetson, no case in North Carolina has directly
addressed the prenatal injury cause of action issue. In DiDonato
v. Wortman, the Supreme Court of North Carolina simply recognized that such an action existed.20 9 Similarly, in Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics& Gynecology Associates, P.A.,21 o the North Carolina Court of Appeals specifically witheld judgment on the issue
of whether the defendants in that case owed a duty to the fetal
plaintiff prior to her reaching viability or whether her achieving
viability was nothing more than a condition precedent to suit
under the Wrongful Death Act. 21 ' Thus, Stetson is the controlling
case on this issue in North Carolina.
C. Analysis
It is clearly the rule in North Carolina that a child who is born
alive can sue to recover damages for injuries suffered while still in
the womb.212 This, however, is where the clarity ends. From the
two cases that address the issue, a single quotation represents the
totality of the stated law regarding this judicially created cause of
action.213
1.

Viability

Stetson does not mention whether a plaintiff must have been

viable at the time the alleged injuries occured in order to state a
cause of action for prenatal injuries. The court simply stated that
a child, if born alive, is allowed to maintain an action on the
ground of actionable negligence.2 14 Tort law, in general, has no
rule on viability, and the majority of American jurisdictions hold
that viability is not a factor in stating a cause of action for prena-

tal injury.215 In several jurisdictions, however, there exists case
law holding the opposite.2 16 While the North Carolina Supreme

209. DiDonato, 320 N.C. at 424, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
210. 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 909 (1988).
211. Id. at 161, 365 S.E.2d at 914.
212. Stetson, 274 N.C. at 156, 161 S.E.2d at 534.
213. See supra text accompanying note 201.
214. The plaintiff in Stetson was a viable fetus at the time of injury.
215. See 62A Am. JuR. 2D Prenatal Injurites; Wrongful Life, Birth, or
Conception § 18 (1990); Kathleen Gormley, Note, A Century of Change:Liability
for PrenatalInjuries, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 268 (1983).
216. Id.
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Court will apparently require viability to state a wrongful death
claim, this fact is of little consequence in the prenatal injury context because a wrongful death claim is purely statutory, and a prenatal injury claim arises from the common law.
Given the majority rule is that viability is not required to
bring a prenatal injury action, coupled with the fact the North
Carolina Supreme Court did not specifically require viability of
the plaintiff when it stated the rule, viability should not be
assumed to be a requirement of a prenatal injury action in North
Carolina. In any event, the conglomerate of critical legal opinion,
including cases, treatises and law reviews, makes clear that this is
the better rule.2 1 7
2.

Damages

The issue of damages is also left open to debate. Given the
North Carolina Supreme Court's limitation of damages for a fetal
plaintiff in a wrongful death case, its silence on this issue with
regard to a claim for prenatal injury is deafening. The issues in
both cases seem to be roughly the same, except that in the wrongful death context damages are deliniated by statute and thus
involve the exercise of statutory construction. The policy considerations, however, are identical. If a fetal plaintiff could not possibly prove he suffered concrete pecuniary damages in a wrongful
death action as a matter of law, how could he prove such damages
in the prenatal injury context? There are some differences, of
course, given that the latter is still alive and may have ascertainable abilities and other "relevant factors" that the former does not.
The problem is the court has given no indication on how it will
view such issues in the prenatal injury context. Again, it should
be assumed that where the court is silent on this issue, normal
tort law rules apply and the plaintiff may recover any damages he
can substanitally prove.

217. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW oF.TORTS § 55,
at 368 n.7 (5th ed. 1984); Kathleen Gormley, Note, A Century of Change:
Liability for PrenatalInjuries, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 268, 271-72 (1983); Michael D.
Morrison, Note, Torts Involving the Unborn:A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L.
REV. 131, 141-44 (1979); 62A Am. JUR. 2D PrenatalInjuries; Wrongful Life, Birth,
or Conception § 6 (1990); Beth D. Osowski, Note, The Need for Logic and
Consistency in Fetal Rights, 68 N.D. L. REV. 171, 191 (1992); Todd v. Sandidge
Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964) (Haynsworth. J., dissenting).
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Contibutory Negligence

North Carolina is among the small minority of states that follow a contributory negligence theory of tort law.2 18 This gives rise
to the issue of whether a child making a claim for prenatal injury
can be barred from recovery because of the negligent acts of his
mother which contributed to his harm. 2 19 The North Carolina
Supreme Court has not reached this issue either. The cause of
action belongs to the child, and he is the plaintiff in law.22 ° The
mother's negligent actions should not serve to bar the child's
action, nor should the child be able to sue the mother for negligence for such acts. 22 1 North Carolina still recognizes parental
immunity.2 2 2 Thus, the mother's negligence should be seen as
irrelevant on the issue of contributory negligence and on the issue
of damages given the rule of joint and several liability.
4.

Malpractice claims

Ledford v. Martin2 2 1 provides that a doctor who takes on an
expectant mother as a patient also has a duty to the unborn child.
When that duty attaches in a prenatal injury suit is unclear. The
issue would presumably revolve around the viability question.2 2 4
The difficulty with this issue is compounded by the lack of gui218. Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, 332 N.C. 645, 648,
423 S.E.2d 72, 73-74 (1992) (holding plaintiff's contributory negligence is a bar to
recovery from a defendant who commits an act of ordinary negligence).
219. See generally, Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal
Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971).
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rule 17(b)(1) (1990 & Supp. 1994).
221. Allowing a child to sue his mother for prenatal injury evokes a frightening
scenario. While there are a few jurisdictions that allow such an action (they have
abolished the family immunity doctrine), most do not allow it. A mother could be
held accountable for any act that could be interpreted to have in some way
harmed the child while in the womb. Poor eating habits, smoking , drinking
alcohol, excessive weight gain, failure to take prenatal vitamins or get adequate
prenatal care - all would be grounds for suit if a child were given the right to do
so. See Deborah M. Santello, Note, MaternalTort Liability for PrenatalInjuries,
22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747 (1988). In the criminal context, the debate becomes
even more heated where district attorneys attempt to prosecute mothers under
drug distribution and child abuse statutes for abusing drugs during pregnancy.
222. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 484, 189 S.E.2d 230, 235 (1972) (holding
children have no cause of action against their parents for ordinary acts of
negligence).
223. 87 N.C. App. 88, 91, 359 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1987), discretionary review
denied, 321 N.C. 473, 365 S.E.2d 1 (1988).
224. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/2

42

Hartsoe: Person or Thing - In Search of the Legal Status of a Fetus: a Sur
LEGAL STATUS OF A FETUS

1995]

211

dance on the parameters of that duty. Does the doctor have equal
duties to both the mother and her unborn child? If so, if it
becomes medically necessary to take action in the care of one that
would harm the other, what is the doctor to do to avoid liability?
The issue of informed consent also arises in this context. A
doctor who fails to obtain informed consent from the mother for a
procedure that causes harm to both the mother and her unborn
child is likely to be liable to both the mother and the child if the
child is born alive.2 2 5
D. A Note about FederalLaw
In Sox v. United States,2 2 6 a prenatal injury case was sucessfully brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In Sox, a
United States Army vehicle negligently struck an automobile carrying a woman who was six months pregnant.2 2 7 As a result of
the accident, the court found the unborn child suffered brain damage which affected her ability to see, hear, speak, comprehend, use
her arms, feet and hands, and to exert any muscular control. 228
As a result, the child was allowed to state a claim under the
Act.

2 29

VII.
A.

CRIMINAL LAw

HistoricalBackground

The common law of England did not recognize the killing of a
unborn child as a homicide. Sir Edward Coke wrote that the killing of a quick, but unborn, child "is a great misprison, and no murder: but if the childe be born alive and dieth ... this is murder: for
in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura,
when it is born alive."2 10 American jurisdictions had fully
accepted the English "born alive" rule by 1850.231 The rationale
for the rule was based on the fact that it was, at the time, very
225. 62A Am. JUR. 2D PrenatalInjuries; Wrongful Life, Birth, or Conception § 7
(1990).
226. 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960).
227. Id. at 467.
228. Id.
229. See infra notes 378-82 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding a
fetus' ability to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim.

230.

Sm EDWARD COKE, THE THmID PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF

50 (David S. Berkowitz el al. eds., 1979).
231. Gary V. Perko, Note, State v. Beale and the Killing of a Viable Fetus:An
Exercise in Statutory Construction and the Potential for Legislative Reform, 68
ENGLAND,
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difficult to establish the corpus delecti of the homicide of an
unborn child, as it was difficult to establish when the fetus began

to live, how it died, and when it died.23 2 Advancements in medical
technology have completely eliminated the basis for this rationale
and some states have changed the rule, either by judicial fiat or by
legislative enactment.
Today, thirty states have adopted the "born alive" rule by
judicial decision.233 North Carolina was the most recent addition
to that list. 23 4 The supreme courts of three states have inter-

preted their homicide statutes to include the killing of a viable
fetus. 235 Five states have enacted statutes which directly address
the killing of a fetus as homicide,236 and others have passed "fetiN.C. L. REV. 1144, 1146 (citing Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal.
1970)).
232. Id. (quoting People v. Guthrie, 334 N.W.2d 616, 617 (Mich. 1983)). See
also R. P. Davis, Annotation, Corpus delecti in prosecutionfor killing of newborn
child, 159 A.L.R. 523 (1945).
233. See Clarke v. State, 23 So. 67 (Ala. 1898); Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d
584 (Ark. 1987); Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970); State v.
Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. 1986); State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); White v. State, 232 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1977); People v. Greer,
402 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1980); State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876); State v.
Trudell, 755 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1988); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky.
1983); State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1980); People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d
775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), appeal denied, 334 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 1983); State v.
Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985); Taylor v. State, 66 So. 321 (Miss. 1914);
State v. Doyle, 287 N.W.2d 59 (Neb. 1980); State in the Interest of A.W.S., 440
A.2d 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); State v. Willis, 652 P.2d 1222 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1982); People v. Hayner, 90 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y. 1949); State v. Beale, 324
N.C. 87, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989); State v. Sogge, 161 N.W. 1022 (N.D. 1917); State v.
Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1971); State v. McKee, 1 Add. 1 (Pa. 1791);
State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982); State v. Evans, 745 S.W.2d 880 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1987); Harris v. State, 12 S.W. 1102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889); State v.
Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978); Lane v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 781 (Va.
1978); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1985); Huebner v.
State, 111 N.W. 63 (Wis. 1907); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963).
234. State v. Beale, 324 N.C. 87, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).
235. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984); State v. Home, 319
S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984); Foster v. State, 196 N.W. 233 (Wis. 1923).
236. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (defining murder as "the
unlawful killing of a human being or a fetus, with malice aforethought"); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 720, para. 9-1.2 (1994) (creating the crime of "Intentional
homicide of an unborn child"); MmiN. STAT. §§ 609.266-.269 (1993) (establishing
separate, comprehensive homicide statutes encompassing unborn children); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1987) (including unborn child of twenty-four
weeks gestational age or more within New York statutory definition of homicide);
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cide" statutes that make killing a fetus a crime on the level of
manslaughter.237
B. North CarolinaLaw
North Carolina recently addressed the issue of fetal homicide
in State v. Beale.238 In Beale, the supreme court held that killing
a viable but unborn fetus is not homicide within the meaning of
the state's murder statute.2 39
The defendant, Donald Ray Beale, Jr., shot his pregnant wife
in the head with a shotgun. Mrs. Beale's unborn child was full
term and twelve days past its expected delivery date on the day
she was shot. Mrs. Beale had been having contractions earlier
that day.240 Mrs. Beale and her baby were pronounced dead on
arrival at the hospital.
Mr. Beale was initially indicted on one count of murder in violation of section 14-17 of the General Statutes of North Carolina,
and one count of destroying a fetus in violation of section 14-44 of
the General Statutes of North Carolina. 24 1 This indictment was
later superceded by an indictment for two counts of murder under
section 14-17.242 Beale moved to dismiss the count of murder of
the unborn child on the basis that his acts did not constitute murder under North Carolina's murder statute.243 The supreme court
chose to review the trial court's denial of Beale's motion on a writ
of certiori.244
The court's task was to "determine whether the unlawful,
willful and felonious killing of a viable but unborn child is murder
within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-17 . "245 The court found that
ANN. § 76-5-201 (1990) (including unborn child within protections of
Utah criminal homicide law).
237. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 782.09 (1976);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 11-23-5 (1981). Georgia's
statute imposes life imprisonment for the crime of feticide, GA. CODE ANN. § 165-80 (1988).
238. 324 N.C. 87, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).
239. Id. at 93, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
240. This fact is significant because it illustrates how close to being born alive
Mrs. Beale's baby actually was.
241. Beale, 324 N.C. at 88, 376 S.E.2d at 1.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1988) read as follows at the time of the case:
1. Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment.
UTAH CODE
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the statute did not define "murder," and thus did not offer direct
guidance on whether that term encompassed the willful killing of
a viable fetus.246 The court then noted that murder as used in the
statue was defined at common law and North Carolina had
adopted the common law.24 v The common law did not recognize
the killing of an unborn child as murder.2 48
The State argued the common law rule should be abandoned,
especially in light of the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision
in DiDonato v. Wortman.2 49 To bolster its argument, the State
cited cases in three states where high courts had abandoned the
common law rule and chose to recognize the killing of an unborn
child as murder under their respective homicide statutes. 25 0 Cit-

ing the court's authority to alter judicially determined common
law when necessary to do so in light of experience and reason, the
State asserted that advances in medical technology had obviated
the rationale of the "born alive" rule.251 The court disagreed.252
The court examined the cases cited by the State in which
three states had abandoned the common law rule.253 It found the
"overwhelming majority of courts" which had considered the issue
and remained with the common law rule more convincing on this
point.25 4 It further found that "[tihe creation and expansion of
criminal offenses is the prerogative of the legislative branch of the
government. The legislature has considered the question of intentionally destroying a fetus and determined the punishment thereA murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in
wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing... shall be deemed to be murder in
the first degree, and any person who commits such murder shall be
punished with death or imprisonment in the State's prison for life as the
the court shall determine ....
All other kinds of murder ... shall be
deemed murder in the second degree, and any person who commits such
murder shall be punished as a class C felon.
The statute has since been amended and remains listed as section 14-17, with
the latest amendment taking effect January 1, 1995.
246. Beale, 324 N.C. at 89, 376 S.E.2d at 1-2.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
250. Beale, 324 N.C. at 90, 376 S.E.2d at 2. See also supra note 235.
251. Beale, 324 N.C. at 90, 376 S.E.2d at 2. See also supra notes 230-32 and
accompanying text (statement of the rule and its rationale).
252. Beale, 324 N.C. at 90, 376 S.E.2d at 2.
253. Id. at 90-92, 376 S.E.2d at 2-4.
254. Id. at 92-93, 376 S.E.2d at 3-4.
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for."2 5

r The statute the court was refererring to was section 14-44.
The existence of this statute, coupled with the fact that the legislature had amended the murder statute more than once without
changing its wording to encompass an unborn child, led the court
to conclude that there was no clear legislative intent to change the
common law rule upon which the statute was based.25 6
Construing the criminal statute narrowly, the court held that
"any extension of the crime of murder under N.C.G.S. § 14-17 is
best left to the discretion and wisdom of the legislature."257
Defendant's motion to dismiss the murder indictment for the killing of the unborn child was allowed and the lower court
reversed.25 8
Under Beale, a person cannot be prosecuted for murder for
the killing of an unborn child under section 14-17. Such a person
can be prosecuted under section 14-44.

C. North CarolinaLaw on Abortion
North Carolina has outlawed abortion since 1881.259 Section
14-44 of the General Statutes of North Carolina reads as follows:
Using drugs or instruments to destroy unborn child.
If any person shall willfully administer to any woman, either pregnant or quick with child, or prescribe for any such woman, or
advise or procure any such woman to take any medicine, drug or
other substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument
or other means with intent thereby to destroy such child, he shall
be punished as a Class H felon.2 6 °
The phrase "either pregnant or quick with child" has been rendered to mean "pregnant with a child that is quick" by the North
Carolina Supreme Court.26 1 Evidence on the question of quickening is required to convict a defendant under this statute.2 6 2 The
mother cannot be prosecuted as an accomplice to the commission
of this felony, even if she consents to it. 26 3 The statute applies to
any act by a party, other than the mother, committed with the
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 92, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
Id. at 93, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
Id.
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1993).

260. Id.
261. State v. Jordan, 227 N.C. 579, 42 S.E.2d 674 (1947).
262. State v. Forte, 222 N.C. 537, 23 S.E.2d 842 (1943).
263. State v. Shaft, 166 N.C. 407, 81 S.E. 932 (1914).
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intent of killing an unborn child, unless such act falls under the
protection of section 14-45.1 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina.
Abortion is legal, however, when performed with the mother's
consent within the first twenty weeks of gestation as long as it
performed by a licensed physician in North Carolina in a hospital
or clinic certified by the state.2 64 Nor is abortion illegal where it is
procured to alleviate a substantial life-threatening risk to the
mother.265 State abortion law is limited by federal case law on the
subject.266
C.

Analysis

The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Beale made
it clear the courts would not assume a legislative role in interpreting the murder statute. Thus, it is very unlikely any prosecutor
will be successful in pursuing murder in a case involving the killing of an unborn child. Currently, the only available avenue of
criminal prosecution is under section 14-44, for which the maximum penalty is ten years imprisonment, a fine, or both.26 7
The result of the court's finding in Beale does not settle well
when compared with the results of DiDonato in the wrongful
death realm. If an unborn child is a "person" for purposes of
wrongful death, it seems to follow logically that he is a "person"
for purposes of the crime of murder as well. The court's opinion in
Beale, however, is soundly reasoned and its restraint admirable.
It is the legislature's task to expand the scope of a criminal statute. Thus, it will be up to the North Carolina General Assembly to
reconcile the inconsistency.268
264. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1993).
265. Id.
266. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny for the scope of
federal abortion law.
267. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1 (1993) for a listing of penalties assigned to
each class of felony in North Carolina. Violation of § 14-44 of the General Statute
of North Carolina is a Class H felony. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1993). Also,
although there have been no cases at the appellate level which have tested this
issue under section 20-141.4 of the General Statutes of North Carolina-the
vehicular homicide statute-or the common law crime of manslaughter, it is very
likely that on the basis of Beale one could not be successfully prosecuted for
killing a fetus in either one of these contexts.
268. See supra notes 253-58 (discussion of possible legislative actions that
would impose a more severe penalty for the killing of an unborn child).
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WRONGFUL LIFE, BIRTH, AND PREGNANCY

A. Historical Background
Claims for wrongful life, birth, and pregnancy are of recent
vintage in the long history of tort law. It was not until abortion
was a legal option to giving birth2 69 that such claims began to proliferate. Now these claims are brought with increasing frequency,
and increasing success.
Wrongful life is a claim brought by, or on behalf of, a child
who has been born with some type of impairment. Typically, the
child will allege that the defendant, normally the mother's physician, did know or should have known before the child was born
that it had the impairment and was negligent in handling that
information. The crux of the claim is, had the child's parents
known of the impairment, they would have aborted the child, saving it from a life filled with misery due to the impairment. In
other words, the child claims that he would have been better off
dead than living with the impairment.
Most wrongful life claims are predicated on one of two scenarios. The first is where the mother's physician negligently fails to
diagnose a fetal impairment before birth or before the third trimester, at which time abortion is no longer an option. The second
is where the physician knows there is a likelihood of impairment,
or positively identifies an impairment, but fails to reveal this
information to the parents or to fully inform them of their options.
Wrongful birth is a medical malpractice claim by the parents
of a child born with an impairment. The complaint alleges that
but for the negligence of the physician in failing to diagnose or
inform them of the impairment before birth, they would have
avoided conception or aborted the child. The cases fall mainly into
the same two categories as the wrongful life claims, but can also
include the scenario of a botched abortion.
Wrongful conception and pregnancy claims also sound in malpractice, being brought by parents who become pregnant after a
negligently performed sterilization or abortion procedure. The
essence of this claim is that the harm flows from the fact a child
has been conceived or born against the parents' wishes.
At present, a majority of American jurisdictions have rejected
claims for wrongful life. 2 70 Eighteen states and the District of
269. See

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

270. The states whose courts have denied wrongful life claims include: Elliott
v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist.
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Columbia have recognized a cause of action for wrongful birth.2 7 '
recognize a claim for
An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
2 72
wrongful pregnancy/conception.

These claims present an incredible spectrum of legal questions that are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that
Ct. App. 1981); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran
Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635
(Kan. 1986); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1987),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988);
Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 332 N.W.2d 432 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 386
N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528
(1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa.
1986); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
Three jurisdictions have recognized wrongful life causes of action: Turpin v.
Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, (Cal. 1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984);
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
271. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Andalon v. Superior
Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d
880 (D.C. 1987); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Pitre v. Opelousas

Gen. Hosp., 517 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1987);

ME. REV. STAT. ANN.

tit. 24,

§ 2931 (West Supp. 1988); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755
(N.J. 1984); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Gallagher v. Duke
Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 852 F.2d
773 (4th Cir. 1988); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981); Phillips v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va.
1985); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
272. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); University of Ariz.
Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc);
Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal.
1982) (en bank); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Fassoulas v.
Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314
S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1984); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Byrd v. Wesley
Medical Center, 699 P.2d 459 (Kan. 1985); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky.
1983); Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 187
N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. 1977); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kingsbury v.
Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981);
Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110
(Pa. 1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v. Burger,
290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984) (en
banc); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v.
Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
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these types of actions exemplify the difficulty the law encounters
when its definitions and policies in one area of the law are not
consistent with those in another closely related area of law.
B.

North CarolinaLaw

North Carolina is among those jurisdictions that has rejected
the wrongful life and wrongful birth claims. It does, however, recognize wrongful pregnancy/conception.
1.

Wrongful Life and Birth

Thus far, the only North Carolina case dealing with these
types of claims is Azzolino v. Dingfelder.2 3 The supreme court, in
a case of first impression, was asked to rule on whether a child
born with Down's Syndrome could recover damages under a claim
of "wrongful life," and whether his parents could likewise recover
damages under a claim for "wrongful birth."2 74 The plaintiffs
alleged that Mrs. Azzolino's physician negligently failed to advise
her and her husband properly, and incorrectly advised them with
respect to the availability of amniocentesis and genetic counseling. The parents claimed that had such testing and counseling
taken place, the results would have revealed the unborn child suffered from Down's Syndrome and they would have had an abortion. Michael Azzolino, the child plaintiff, claimed he suffered
damages simply by being born with Down's Syndrome and but for
the doctor's negligence, he would never have suffered birth and
life with his affliction. 5
In a third claim, Michael's siblings alleged his birth forced
financial and emotional hardship on the entire family and had
deprived them of the society of their parents, who were now forced
to spend the bulk of their time at home caring for Michael.2 7 6 The
Azzolino court summed up the gravamen of the case: "The essence
of the plaintiffs' claims is that but for the negligence of the defendants, Michael would never have been born at all and he, his parents and his siblings would not have suffered from his affliction
with Down's Syndrome."2 7 7
The Azzolino court approached the issues separately, beginning with the wrongful life claim. Considering whether such a
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986).
Id. at 104, 337 S.E.2d at 530.
Id. at 104-105, 337 S.E.2d at 530.
Id.
Id. at 108, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
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cause of action would lie in this jurisdiction, the court assumed for
the sake of argument that the defendants owed a duty to Michael
in utero and had breached this duty and were thus the proximate
cause of his birth. 2 78 The court further assumed for the sake of

argument the parents would have actually had an amniocentesis
after proper counseling and then had Michael aborted in lieu of
the Down's Syndrome diagnosis. 27 9 The question left for resolution

was whether, under application of traditional tort concepts,
Michael "ha[d] suffered any legally cognizable injury."280 The
Azzolino court disagreed with the court of appeals' finding that it
was "unwilling, and indeed, unable to say as a matter of law that
life even with the most severe and debilitating of impairments is
always preferable to nonexistence,"28 1 stating that "[wie take a
view contrary to that of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, we conclude that life, even live with severe defects, cannot be an injury in
the legal sense."28 2 This conclusion formed the foundation upon
which the rest of the court's decision was forged.
The court in Azzolino was not unappreciative of the difficult
issues evoked by this type of case, and shared the concerns
expressed by the plaintiffs. But absent "clear legislative guidance
to the contrary," the court found more compelling the view of the
New York Court of Appeals in a similar case which held that
"Ir]ecognition of so novel a cause of action requiring, as it must,
creation of a hypothetical formula for the measurement of an
infant's damages is best reserved for legislative, rather than judicial attention."28 The court also noted that the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions which had considered the issue had
rejected wrongful life claims, and reversed the court of appeals,
holding that "such claims . . . are not cognizable at law in this

jurisdiction." 8 4
The Azzolino court next examined the parents' claim for
wrongful birth, noting immediately that courts which had considered the question had almost unanimously recognized claims for
wrongful birth when the parents would have aborted the child but
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 109, 337 S.E.2d at 532 (quoting Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App.
289, 300, 322 S.E.2d 567, 576 (1984)).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 109-10, 337 S.E.2d at 533 (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d
807, 812 (N.Y. 1978)).
284. Id. at 110, 337 S.E.2d at 533.
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for the negligence of the defendant.285 Despite this trend, the
court held that "claims for relief for wrongful birth of defective
children 28 1 shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction absent a
clear mandate by the legislature."28 v
In its analysis of the wrongful birth claim, the Azzolino court
again assumed a duty was owed and subsequently breached by
the defendants, strictly for the sake of argument.28 8 The issue of
proximate cause was a little stickier in this instance since even
the plaintiffs admitted Michael was already in existence and
genetically defective when they first met the defendants. Nevertheless, the court assumed proximate cause also existed for the
sake of argument.289
Justice Mitchell, dealing only with the issue of damages given
the court's assumptions in argument, noted the only "damages the
plaintiffs allege they have suffered arise, if at all, from the failure
of the defendants to take steps which would have led to abortion of
the already existing and defective fetus."290 Justice Mitchell
found that although courts which had recognized wrongful birth
actions claimed to answer the damages question through application of traditional tort analysis, to hold ."the existence of a human
life can constitute an injury congnizable at law .

.

. such a step

requires a view of human life previously unknown to the law of
this jurisdiction."29 1
285. Id. (citing Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort Liability for Wrongfully
Causing One to be Born, 83 A.L.R.3D 15 (1978 & Supp. 1985)).
286. It appears to be a trend that writers in this area refer to children born
with physical deformaties, congenital diseases, or some other form of impairment
as "defective children." This is disturbing. Defective has definite negative
connotations in American society and use of the term in this context makes an
inherent value statement with regard to how the child to which it refers is
viewed. When society accepts that a human being should be viewed as
"defective" it starts down the slippery slope towards making value judgments as
to a minimum acceptable standard of life. Anyone that falls below that level can
then be legally viewed as expendable, supported by the rationale used in
wrongful life and birth cases, that even though they are now living, it would be
better for them to die than to continue on with an affliction that brings their life
below the minimum acceptable level. This is, of course, one of the primary
rationales for euthanasia of the terminally ill, and thus, the trip down the
slippery slope has already begun in some respects.
287. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 110, 337 S.E.2d at 533.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 111, 337 S.E.2d at 533.
290. Id. at 111, 337 S.E.2d at 534.
291. Id.
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The Azzolino court reviewed the approaches of other jurisdictions which had recognized a wrongful birth action and concluded
there reigned an uncertainty and lack of uniformity amongst
them.2 9 2 Justice Mitchell wondered if this seeming confusion on
the issue derived from a failure to recognize:
That the "injury" for which they seek to compensate the plaintiffs
is the existence of a human life. As a result:
Although courts and commentators have attempted to make it
such, wrongful birth is not an ordinary tort. It is one thing to
compensate destruction; it is quite another to compensate creation. This so-called "wrong" is unique: It is a new and ongoing condition. As life, it necessarily interacts with other
lives. Indeed, it draws its "injurious" nature from the predilections of the other lives it touches. It is naive to suggest
that such a situation falls neatly into conventional tort principles, producing neatly calculable damages.2 93
The Azzolino court also recognized other problems inherent in the
recognition of a claim for wrongful birth. Fraud would be of particular concern for the claim would always hinge on the testimony
of the parents that they would have definitely chosen to terminate
the pregnancy had they known of the unborn child's impairments.2 94 Another concern was the ability of parents to decide
which "defects" would have caused them to abort the child.2 9 5 The
Azzolino court wondered whether parents would be allowed to
recover on a claim that they would have aborted had they known
that their unborn child was one sex and they wanted the other, or
that the child carried a "deleterious gene" but was otherwise
unimpaired.2 9 6 These questions were viewed as especially pertinent in light of the fact that federal case law guaranteed a
right to abortion for any reason before the point of viabilwoman's
ity.2 9 7 The upshot of this analysis was Justice Mitchell's
conclusion:
As medical science advances in its capability to detect genetic
imperfections in a fetus, physicians in jurisdictions recognizing
claims for wrongful birth will be forced to carry an increasingly
292. Id. at 111-12, 337 S.E.2d at 533-34.
293. Id. at 112-13, 337 S.E.2d at 534-35 (quoting Dierdre A. Burgman,
Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL.
U. L. REV. 127, 170 (1978)).
294. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 113, 337 S.E.2d at 535.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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heavy burden in determining what information is important to
parents when attempting to obtain their informed consent for the
fetus to be carried to term. Inevitably this will place increased
pressure upon physicians to take the "safe" course by recommending abortion .... Although it is not the controlling consideration in our rejection of claims for wrongful birth, we do not wish
to
2 98
create a claim for relief which will encourage such results.
Justices Exum, Frye, and Martin dissented from the majority's opinion on the sole issue of the parents' wrongful birth claim,
finding that such a claim should be recognized based on the
weight of authority from other jurisdictions.
2.

Wrongful Pregnancy/ Conception

Again, North Carolina has examined this issue exactly once
at the supreme court level. The court of appeals, in Pierce v.
Piver,2 99 has ruled a plaintiff states a cognizable cause of action in
North Carolina when alleging pregnancy as the injury. The Pierce
court, in a very terse opinion, simply stated the claim was one for
medical malpractice sounding in tort and contract, and thus, the
plaintiffs had adequately plead a cause of action.3 ° ° Judge Wells
concurred with the majority to the extent the plaintiff could
legally request recovery of fees paid to the defendant, the pregnancy and delivery related expenses, and pain and suffering
related to the pregnancy and birth. 30 1 There was no elaboration
in the opinion regarding the rationale for recognizing such a cause
of action, the issues raised by its recognition, or even that it was a
case of first impression on the issue of whether pregnancy could be
legally claimed to be an injury.
In Jackson v. Bumgardner, °2 the plaintiffs, a married couple,
alleged medical malpractice on the part of the defendant doctor
who removed an intrauterine device (IUD) from the wife during
ovarian cyst surgery, allowing her to become pregnant against the
couple's wishes.30 3 The couple had secured the defendant's assurances before the procedure was performed that he would replace
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 114, 337 S.E.2d at 535.
45 N.C. App. 111, 262 S.E.2d 320 (1980).
Id. at 113, 262 S.E.2d at 321-22.
Id. at 113, 262 S.E.2d at 322.
318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986).
Id. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 744-45.
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the IUD if it were ever necessary to remove it during surgery. 3 0 4
The wife delivered a healthy full-term baby.30 5
Justice Frye, writing for a unanimous court,30 6 found the
issue before the court was "whether plaintiffs' complaint states a
claim recognizable in this State for medical malpractice and
breach of contract where the injury complained of is defendant's
improper failure to replace an intrauterine device, resulting in
plaintiff wife's pregnancy and the consequent birth of a healthy
child." 3 1 7 Justice Frye approached the issue employing traditional
medical malpractice analysis.3 0° Establishing that a duty is owed
by a physician to a patient, and the extent of such duty under
North Carolina law, the court found the facts of the case as alleged
30 9
were sufficient to make out a claim for malpractice.
The Jackson court bolstered its opinion by noting the vast
majority of courts to have considered the issue of wrongful conception/pregnancy treated the claim exactly as it had - as indistinguishable from an ordinary medical malpractice claim.3 10 The
defendant owed the plaintiffs a legally recognized duty to abide by
their wishes in maintaining the IUD in the wife's body, and
breached this duty when he failed to do so for no medically necessary reason, proximately causing the wife to become pregnant,
damage being the medical condition of
with the resulting
3 11
pregnancy.
The court in Jackson was quick to point out that, despite
defendant's urging to the contrary, the case was distinguishable
from its decision in Azzolino on the issue of damages being
claimed by the plaintiffs. Azzolino, the court opined, was a case
wherein the injury claimed was the continued existence of the
deformed child. In the case at bar, the injury was the "fact of the
pregnancy as a medical condition that gives rise to compensable
damages .... "312 The court also explicitly distinguished between
304. Id. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 745.
305. Id.
306. Justice Martin concurred in the majority's holding that the couple could
sue for "wrongful conception" and dissented from the majority's holdings on the
issue of damages and the contract claim.
307. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 174, 347 S.E.2d at 744.
308. Id. at 178, 347 S.E.2d at 747.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 179, 347 S.E.2d at 747.
311. Id. at 178, 347 S.E.2d at 747.
312. Id. at 181, 347 S.E.2d at 748 (emphasis in original).
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cases alleging the defendant contributed to causing the pregnancy
3 13
versus cases where the contraception method itself failed.
Based on this tort law analysis, the Jackson court recognized
the plaintiffs' claim of wrongful pregnancy/conception.3 1 4 The
next issue was whether the husband, who had not been physically
involved and could only be vicariously subjected to the medical
condition of pregnancy, could collect damages for wrongful pregnancy/conception.3 15
The Jackson court held the only allowable damages in a case
for wrongful pregnancy/conception were the costs associated with
the pregnancy, such as hospital and medical expenses of the pregnancy, pain and suffering connected with the pregnancy, lost
wages, and loss of consortium. 3 16 The court specifically rejected
any claims for damages associated with rearing the resulting child
on the two-pronged theory that life could never be a legal injury
and such damages were too speculative to be legally allowed.3 1 7
The Fourth Circuit has weighed the issue of wrongful pregnancy/conception as well. In Gallagher v. Duke University,3 1' a
diversity action applying North Carolina law, the federal appellate court reviewed a case wherein the plaintiffs were the parents
of an unwanted child who was born with severe impairments.3 1 9
The impaired child also filed an action for wrongful life. The parents' claim was essentially one for wrongful pregnancy/
conception.3 2 °
The Gallagher's first child, Jennifer, suffered from severe
impairments at birth and subsequently died a short time thereafter.32 1 Dr. Mickey, a defendant, concluded Jennifer's impairments
were not genetically based. With this assessment, the staff at
Duke University Hospital advised the Gallaghers their chances of
313. Id. at 181, 347 S.E.2d at 749.
314. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 749.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 183, 347 S.E.2d at 749-50.
317. Id. at 182-83, 347 S.E.2d at 749-50 (citing Azzolino and DiDonato).
318. 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988).
319. Id.
320. The federal district court had referred to the claim as one for wrongful
birth. It is difficult, without the complaint, to know which is really more
accurate. Given the facts and allegations described by the appellate court, the
claim sounds more like one for wrongful conception as it is defined by North
Carolina law.
321. Gallagher,852 F.2d at 774-775.
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having a normal baby was the same as the general population.3 2 2
The staff also advised the plaintiffs that it was not necessary for
them to be genetically tested given the negative results of Jennifer's tests. Based on this information, the couple became pregnant and was advised by the University of North Carolina Genetic
Counseling Department that no amniocentesis was necessary
based on Jennifer's test results.3 23
The second Gallagher child, Lisa, was born with severe
impairments very similar to those of Jennifer. After additional
genetic testing, it was determined that Mr. Gallagher carried a
defective gene which had caused the impairments in both Jennifer
and Lisa.
The parents sued, alleging they would not have conceived
Lisa had they known of the genetic defect.3 24 They prayed for
recovery of the extraordinary expenses of caring for Lisa for the
rest of her life, the loss of Lisa's future earnings, and for their own
emotional distress. 3 2 5 The district court allowed the wrongful conception claim and awarded damages on the extraordinary medical
expenses that would be incurred during the parents' lifetimes.3 26
It denied damages for emotional distress and dismissed Lisa Gallagher's wrongful life claim2
The sole issue on appeal was "[d]id the district court err in
concluding that a claim for relief for the wrongful birth of a geneti3 28
cally defective child is cognizable under North Carolina Law?"
The Gallagher court's analysis began with an examination of
North Carolina law as expressed by Jackson v. Bumgardner.3 29
Based on Jackson, the Gallaghercourt found a cause of action had
been recognized in North Carolina for wrongful conception of a
healthy child.3 3 0 Given the Jackson court's analysis, the federal
court in Gallagherconcluded North Carolina would also recognize
322. Id. at 775.
323. Id.
324. Id. The court does not indicate the couple alleged the defendants were
also negligent in not diagnosing Lisa's impairments in utero through the use of
amniocentesis and that they would have aborted her had they known of the
impairments.
325. Gallagher,852 F.2d at 775.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986).
330. Id.
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a wrongful conception cause of action when the product of concep33
tion is an impaired child. '
The Gallagher court turned next to the question of what constituted the proper measure of damages in such a case. Again consulting Jackson, the court noted North Carolina did not allow
recovery for child rearing expenses in a wrongful conception case
when the unwanted child was born healthy. The rationale for this
rule was the Jackson court's reliance on its prior decision in
Azzolino v. Dingfelder which held that "life, even life with severe
defects, cannot be an injury in the legal sense."3 3 2 The court also
held that the Jackson court had found the "recovery of the costs of
rearing a normal child should not be allowed because of the difficulty of determining the value of the offsetting benefits from the
child's life."3 3 3
The court proceeded to distinguish the case at bar from the
facts in either Jackson or Azzolino on the basis that the case
presented no problem of trying to offset the costs of child rearing
with the benefits of having a child because "[n]o evidence of benefits was introduced. Lisa was profoundly impaired."33 4 Nor was
the jury shouldered with the burden of speculation on such damages because "[tihe court's charge did not require the jury to
attempt to offset the extraordinary costs of caring for Lisa by any
benefits. 3 3 5 Based on the nature of Lisa's impairments, the court
held North Carolina courts would not attempt to apply any type of
offset analysis to such a case. 3 6 Accordingly, the court concluded
Lisa's case did not present the same "fatal calculation problem
that Jackson discussed. 3 3 7
The Gallagher court moved to the question of whether
Azzolino would preclude the Gallaghers' cause of action and damages. Judge Butzner simply recited the facts of that case and its
holding. He then noted the Jackson court's refusal to dismiss the
Jacksons' claim in lieu of Azzolino, based on the differences
3 38
between the nature of the claims being made in the two cases.
331. Gallagher, 852 F.2d at 776.
332. Id. (quoting Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 109, 111, 337 S.E.2d
528, 532, 534 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986)).
333. Id. See infra notes 358-72 and accompanying text regarding the court of
appeals' liberal interpretation of this holding in Jackson.
334. Gallagher, 852 F.2d at 776.
335. Id. at 777.
336. Id. See infra notes 358-72 and accompanying text.
337. Gallagher,852 F.2d at 777.
338. Id. (citing Jackson, 318 N.C. at 180-81, 347 S.E.2d at 748).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995

59

Campbell
Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

228

[Vol. 17:169

The Gallagher court concluded the Gallaghers' claim was for
wrongful conception, not wrongful birth, despite the district
court's reference to it as such. 339 Accordingly, the court opined
that the differences between Mrs. Azzolino's claim and Mrs. Jackson's claim applied to the Gallagher's claim and, thus, their claim
for wrongful conception was not barred.34 °
The court in Gallagher then held that neither Azzolino nor
Jackson, alone or taken together, barred the Gallaghers' claims
for the extraordinary expenses of Lisa's care, and upheld the district court's judgment allowing such damages to be awarded.3 41
The court denied the Gallaghers' claim for extraordinary expenses
Lisa would incurr after their deaths, as the claim they were making was theirs, not hers. Based on the strength of Ledford v. Martin 34 2 and Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates,
the court in Gallagher allowed their claim for emotional
P.A. ,
distress.34 4
C.

Analysis

A full discussion of the issues, arguments, policies and trends
driving the law of wrongful life, birth, and pregnancy/conception
litigation is well beyond the scope of this Article. Accordingly, the
focus of this analysis section will be on what the law in these areas
appears to be in North Carolina as of the date of this Article.
Wrongful life/birth
Azzolino makes it very clear there is no cause of action in
North Carolina for wrongful life or wrongful birth as those actions
are defined in that case. Gallagher obstensibly has no effect on
the availability of either of these actions, as it dealt with a wrongsceful conception. Although Azzolino presented only one factual3 45
1.

nario under which a claim for wrongful life was being made,

it

is very likely the court would reach the same conclusion with
regard to any claim based on an assertion the injury suffered by
339. Id. at 777-78.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 778.
342. 87 N.C. App. 88, 359 S.E.2d 505 (1987), discretionary review denied, 321
N.C. 473, 365 S.E.2d 1 (1988).
343. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
344. Gallagher, 852 F.2d at 778.
345. E.g., but for defendant's negligence, the plaintiff's parents would have
aborted him.
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the plaintiff is existence versus non-existence,6 or in essence, that
34
the person would have been better off dead.
The same is true of any claim for wrongful birth based on the
assertion the parents would have aborted but for the negligence of
the defendant. This is so because the court has tied wrongful
birth and wrongful life claims together with a common fatal
thread - both require analysis which views human existence as
an injury.3 4 7 Thus, any action before the court claiming damages
that arise "from the failure of the defendants to take steps which
would have led to abortion of the already existing and defective
fetus,"348 is likely to fail. The status of the law is unlikely to
change in the near future, unless such change comes from the legislature, given the Azzolino court's holding that absent clear legislative guidance to the contrary it would not recognize such
causes of action.3 4 9
The court in Azzolino did not deal with the issue of whether
its holding would deny parents their constitutionally protected
right to control their reproduction. The Ohio Supreme Court has
held a cause of action brought by parents of a child born subsequent to a negligently performed sterilization procedure on the
mother was not barred by public policy because the choice to procreate is part of one's constitutionally protected right to privacy,
and a court's endorsement of a judicial policy that subjects physicians to liability for malpractice in other areas, but denies such
liability in those areas involving sterilization, constitutes an
impermissible infringement of a fundamental right.3 5 °
Other courts have approached this question with the presumption parents have a constitutional right to prevent the birth
of a defective child and, accordingly, health care providers have a
correlating duty to do what is necessary to enable parents to exer-

346. See the Azzolino court's holding that "life, even life with severe defects,
cannot be an injury in the legal sense." Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 109,
337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986).
347. See Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 109-11, 337 S.E.2d at 532-34.
348. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 111, 337 S.E.2d at 534. This would include claims
for failure to diagnose genetic or other congential disorders before birth,
negligent sterilization, negligent abortion, or any other scenario making this

claim.
349. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 109, 116, 337 S.E.2d at 532, 536.
350. Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio 1976).
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cise that right.351 There is, however, no recognized fundamental
3 52
right not to be born.
The notion that parents have a privately enforceable right to
be free from the negligence of health care providers, supposedly
rooted in federal reproductive jurisprudence, raises a multitude of
issues on several different legal planes. Suffice it to say North
Carolina has not addressed the issue, and at present no cause of
action for wrongful life or birth is recognized on this or any other
basis.
A cause of action for wrongful pregnancy/conception is recog353
nized in North Carolina on the basis of Jackson v. Bumgardner.
Such an action, viewed by the court as nothing more than a medical malpractice claim, 3 5 4 is defined by the facts of that case. Thus,
where: (1) a plaintiff alleges her physician owed a duty to give care

and counseling with regard to her reproductive functioning in a
manner consistent with accepted medical standards, and, (2) the
physician breached that duty (failed to diagnose genetic defects
prior to conception, properly perform sterilization procedure, etc.),
and , (3) as a direct result of such breach an unwanted pregnancy
occurred, resulting in pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost
wages, and loss of consortium-all associated with childbirthshe states a legally recognized cause of action in North Carolina.
There is no requirement that the resulting child be impaired. The
crux of the claim is that the alleged malpractice resulted in the
35 5
injury of being pregnant.

It is important to distinguish terms at this point. Courts have
tended to use the terms wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy interchangably when there is a technical difference
between the two. Wrongful conception should be used to denote
351. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
352. See Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
353. 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d 743 (1986).
354. The use of the medical malpractice paradigm in Jackson was simply a
function of the facts involved in that particular case. A wrongful conception
action should be possible in any sitution where it can be alleged the injury is the
medical condition of pregnancy. A situation where a sex partner lies about their
fertility which results in pregnancy is but one example that is outside of the
medical malpractice realm. See Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partners
Tort Liability to Other Partner for Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding
Sterility or Use of Birth Control Resulting in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R. 5th 301 (1992);
62A Am. JuR. 2D PrenatalInjuries; Wrongful Life, Birth, or Conception § 1-180
(1990).

355. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 181, 347 S.E.2d at 748.
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any claim wherein the injury claimed is becoming pregnant.
Thus, by definition, it involves only pre-conception negligence.
Wrongful pregnancy, on the other hand, more accurately denotes
negligence in terminating an already existing pregnancy. This
involves post-conception negligence. Wrongful pregnancy is distinguished from wrongful birth on the basis that the latter claims
as the injury the fact that an impaired child was allowed to be
born where, but for the negligence of the defendant, it would have
been aborted. Wrongful pregnancy claims as the injury the fact
that any child was born, whether impaired or healthy. 5 6 The
cause of action recognized in Jackson is more accurately called
wrongful conception.
2.

Damages

The question of what damages are available to a plaintiff
asserting a cause of action for wrongful conception is where the
picture starts to haze. The fog is created by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Gallagherv. Duke University.3 57 In
Jackson, the North Carolina Supreme Court held the only recoverable damages in such cases were those associated with the pregnancy, such as the hospital and medical expenses of the
pregnancy, pain and suffering connected thereto, lost wages, and
loss of consortium. 3 58 The Jackson court also explicitly held plaintiffs could not recover for the costs of rearing their (unexpected)
child. 5 9
The Jackson court based its denial of the child rearing costs
on two tenets.3 60 The first was its belief that the rationale and
holding of its prior decision in Azzolino would prohibit such recovery.3 61 The second was the court's unwillingness to impose on
juries the task of offsetting the benefits from the child's life
against the expense of raising him, because the results would necessarily be based on speculation and conjecture - "Who, indeed,
can strike a pecuniary balance between the triumphs, the failures,
the ambitions, the disappointments, the joys, the sorrows, the
pride, the shame, the redeeming hope that the child may bring to
356. See 62A Am. JuR. 2D Prenatal Injuries; Wrongful Life, Birth, or
Conception §§ 89-94 (1990).
357. 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988).
358. Jackson, 318 N.C. at 182, 347 S.E.2d at 749.

359. Id.
360. Id.

361. Id.
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those who love him?"3 62 Thus, the state's highest court has stated
as a matter of law a plaintiff bringing an action for wrongful conception cannot collect child rearing expenses as damages.
In Gallagherv. Duke University, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, held the exact opposite to be true where the
unwanted child was born with significant impairments.363 The
court correctly interpreted Jackson to allow a wrongful conception
claim where the resulting child was not born healthy. 364 The
cause of action does not regard the health of the resulting child as
relevant. The crucial point, according to Jackson, is that the medical condition of pregnancy is the injury that characterizes the
wrongful conception action. Thus, it follows that even a plaintiff
who becomes pregnant due to the defendant's negligence and then
proceeds to abort the child can state a cause of action for wrongful
other
conception to recover the cost of the abortion, as well as any 36
5
damages within the ambit of those provided for in Jackson.
The federal court's finding in Gallagher regarding child rearing damages is not in line with Jackson and should be viewed with
great suspicion. The problem with the federal court's analysis
begins with its characterization of the rationale used by the Jackson court to disallow such damages. In Gallagher,Judge Butzner
first stated the court "held... that the Jacksons could not recover
the costs of rearing their healthy baby."31 6 He then states "[t]he
Court also reasoned that recovery of the costs of rearing a normal
child should not be allowed because of the difficulty of determining the value of the offsetting benefits from the child's life."367
This is inaccurate. Nowhere did the Jackson Court make the distinction, either expressly or impliedly, between a normal child and
one with impairments. This mischaracterization of part of Jackson's rationale for denying child rearing expenses was used by the
federal court in Gallagher to create an artificial distinction - a
healthy child versus an impaired one-- and the court proceeded
362. Id. at 183, 347 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301,
307 (Va. 1986)).
363. Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988).
364. Id. at 776.
365. See Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982) (damages awarded
for cost of abortion, mother's pain and suffering, and mother's lost wages); JACOB
A. STEiN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS
§ 221.1 (Supp. 1990).
366. Gallagher,852 F.2d at 776.
367. Id. (emphasis added).
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to disregard clearly controlling authority to make a holding contrary to the existing law of North Carolina.
Based on this distinction, the Gallagher court stated that,
unlike the healthy child in Jackson, Lisa Gallagher's condition
presented no problem of trying to offset child rearing costs 368 with
the benefits of parenthood because she was profoundly
impaired. 36 9 The clear implication is the court sees Lisa Gallagher as so impaired as to be utterly worthless to her parents in
terms of giving them affection, joy, moral courage, etc. It is reprehensible that a court would be willing to make such an assessment as a matter of law. As the Virginia Supreme Court stated in
Miller v. Johnson, and cited in Jackson, who indeed can strike
such a balance?3 70 Certainly not judges who have never seen the
child.
Nor should a child's ability to be of "value" to its parents have
been in question in Gallagherto begin with. The North Carolina
Supreme Court had clearly held there were two reasons not to
allow child rearing damages. Child rearing damages are by definition compensation for the pecuniary cost of the existence of the
child. Azzolino held human existence, even life cursed with severe
impairments, could never be an injury in the legal sense. 3 7 1 The
Gallagher court never addressed this first reason, and Azzolino
would not allow such damages to be awarded. Secondly, the
supreme court in Jackson held child rearing damages, whether for
a healthy child or for one suffering "severe defects," were not to be
allowed.3 7 2 The federal court's finding to the contrary violates the
plain language and spirit of the law stated in both Azzolino and
Jackson, and should be regarded as nothing more than peripheral
by North Carolina courts.
One issue which has not been addressed by any courts of
jurisidiction in North Carolina is mitigation of damages. Given a
wrongful conception action complains the medical condition of
pregnancy is the injury, the question arises whether the mother
must mitigate her damages by obtaining an abortion or by placing
368. The court also employs subtle word changes in this part of its analysis,
referring to child rearing expenses, the term used in Jackson, as "costs of care,"
which tends to reinforce its distinction between the healthy and impaired
children. Id.

369.
370.
371.
372.

Gallagher,852 F.2d at 778.
See Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 307 (Va. 1986).
Azzolino, 315 N. C. at 109, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
Jackson, 318 N.C. at 180, 347 S.E.2d at 748.
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the child up for adoption. This issue would also apply in the context of an action claiming violation of the plaintiffs right to control her own reproduction. The violation would end with the
abortion. The Jackson court noted the wrongful conception claim
arose out of traditional tort analysis and was no different than any
other medical malpractice claim.3 73 Would it not follow that a
plaintiff must do all she could to mitigate her damages, as this is a
basic tenet of tort law?3 7 4 This question becomes particularly significant when discussing whether parents should be able to
recover child rearing expenses.
Few courts have broached the issue, but the general rule that
has emerged from those which have is there is no such mitigation
requirement.3 7 5 While most of these cases deal with the issue in
the context of a wrongful birth claim, it follows that the same
rationales would apply in the wrongful conception context as
well. 3 76 Also, there is the question of whether the overall public
policy goal to protect human life would be violated by a tort policy
requiring abortion.3 7 7

373. Id. at 179, 347 S.E.2d at 747.
374. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 3.3 (1966); Smith v. Childs, 112 N.C. App. 672,
437 S.E.2d 500 (1993).
375. See 62A AM. JuR. 2D Prenatal Injuries; Wrongful Life, Birth, or
Conception § 119 n.92 (1990).
376. See Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986) (noting that unwillingess to
apply "avoidable consequenes" rule, which would require placing child for
adoption, was reason why only extraordinary medical and educational expenses
and not normal child-raising expenses were allowed in wrongful birth cases);
Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982) (indicating that one reason for
denying child-raising expenses in wrongful conception cases was to avoid putting
upon parents "the awesome choices of having an abortion or putting the child up
for adoption as a course of mitigating damages"); Comras v. Lewin, 443 A.2d 229
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1982) (fact that abortion was diagnosed in second trimester
did not preclude plaintiff from recovering for birth of defective child, even though
her theory of recovery was based on fact that with earlier diagnosis she would
have had an abortion, since effect of delayed diagnosis was to increase risks of
abortion); Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301 (Va. 1986) (noting, in rejecting childrearing expenses for birth of healthy baby, that contrary ruling might raise issue
whether plaintiff should have submitted to abortion or placed child for adoption).
377. For a general discussion of the view a duty to mitigate may exist, see 62A
AM. JuR. 2D PrenatalInjuries; Wrongful Life, Birth, or Conception § 121 (1990).
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OTHER PERTINENT AREAS OF THE LAW

A. Fetus' right to assert federal civil rights claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983
The question of whether a fetus is a "person" capable of stating a claim under the federal civil rights statute has arisen mainly
in the context of an action to collect welfare benefits. Pregnant
mothers with no other children have claimed a violation of their
unborn child's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The general
trend has been to deny such claims on the premise an unborn
child is not a "person" under the Fourteeth Amendment of the
Constitution, v8 and thus cannot state a claim for violation of
rights arising under that Amendment. 79 Some federal courts,
however, have held to the contrary and allowed section 1983
claims asserted by unborn children. 3 0 The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed an unborn child could state a section 1983
claim for denial of equal protection in a class action case in Virginia seeking Aid for Families with Dependant Children benefits
for unborn children. 38 ' Therefore, plaintiffs in North Carolina
may be able to pursue other types of section 1983 claims on behalf
of unborn children, such as an action against a law enforcement
officer who injures an unborn child during an attack on its
mother.38 2
B. Unborn Children and Insurance Law
North Carolina courts have not dealt with this subject as of
the date of this Article, but it is likely they will in the near future.
In the mean time, insurers and insureds would be wise to consider
the issue of whether an unborn child is an "insured" or "injured"
person under various insurance policies. Given North Carolina's
recognition of an unborn child as a "person" in the wrongful death
and prenatal injury contexts, the question is certainly one that is
open for debate. Both sides will need to consider the issue of viability as well.
378. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
379. See generally Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Fetus as Person on Whose
Behalf Action May Be Brought Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, 64 A.L.R. FED. 886
(1983).
380. Id.
381. Doe v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
382. See Douglas v. Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982).
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Suprisingly, the issue of whether an unborn child is covered
by the language of a particular insurance policy has reached the
appellate courts only a few times. 8 3 Of the three courts that have
considered the issue, two have considered viability a crucial issue,
while the third explicitly rejected viability as a determinative
test.38 4 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed
this issue.
Workers' Compensation and the Unborn Child
North Carolina also has not addressed the issue of how its
workers' compensation statute would apply to the unborn child.
The primary question would be whether a work-related injury suffered by the child's mother which also injured the child would
require the unborn child to proceed under the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.3 8 5 Only Texas and
Louisiana have decided this issue, with each holding the exclusivity provisions of their state's workers' compensation acts did not
preclude an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child.3 8
Another issue arising under workers' compensation law is
whether a mother may maintain a cause of action for emotional
distress against her employer for the death of her child resulting
from an on-the-job injury. Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A., 38 7 and Ledford v. Martin38 8 allow a mother
to assert a civil cause of action for emotional distress connnected
with the wrongful death or injury of her unborn child. The Workers' Compensation Act, however, is silent on this issue and its definition of "injury"3 9 is so broad as to be ambiguous on whether a
C.

383. See generally Wanda Wakefield, Annotation, Unborn Child as Insured or
Injured Person Within Meaning of Insurance Policy, 15 A.L.R. 4th 548 (1982).
384. Id.
385. Chapter 97 of the General Statutes of North Carolina denotes the Act.
Section 97-10.1 provides the Act is the exclusive remedy for an employee injured
on the job. An employee cannot file a civil claim in a court of general jurisdiction
for pain and suffering, medical expenses, permanent injuries, etc., if the injury
occurred while working for an employer covered by the Act, unless the injury
falls under an exception thereto (intentional act).
386. Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987); Adams v.
Denny's Inc., 464 So. 2d 876 (La. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 530 (La.
1985).
387. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990).
388. 87 N.C. App. 88, 359 S.E.2d 505 (1987), discretionaryreview denied, 321
N.C. 473, 365 S.E.2d 1 (1988).
389. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
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court would include this scenario within its rubric. Nationally,
only one case has decided this issue. That case held an employee's
claim for mental anguish suffered after loss of her fetus due to a
work-related injury was barred under the state's workers' compensation act because her mental anguish arose out of the workrelated injury, and there was no basis for making a distinction
3 90
between such an injury and any other injury covered by the act.
D. Property Law and the Unborn Child
The law of property has long recognized the unborn child as a
legal entity for the purposes of inheritance. Given the well-established character of the law in this area, it warrants only brief
mention here. In North Carolina an unborn child is deemed a person capable of taking by deed, or other writing, any estate in the
same way as if he were born.3 9 1 This right attaches at conception. 39 2 The granting of "legal personality" is imputed to the
unborn child for beneficial, but not detrimental purposes. 9 3
X.

THE STATUS OF THE FETUS IN NORTH CAROLINA: ANSWERING

"THE QUESTION"

It is difficult to say what the status of the fetus is in North
Carolina. While there is some case law and several statutes on
the subject, there is an overall paucity of law - case or statutory
that defines the legal status of the fetus. The law that does
exist is inconsistent. For example, consider the question of "Is a
fetus a 'person?'" North Carolina's constitution has been interpreted to say a fetus is not a "person."3 94 Conversely, the Wrongful Death Act's use of the word does include a viable fetus. 9 5
North Carolina common law views the fetus, regardless of viability, as a person capable of bringing a tort claim for injuries suffered before birth.3 9 6 The State's property law views the fetus as a
living child capable of inheriting, and its procedural law recognizes the fetus as a being for which a guardian ad litem can be
390.
1987).
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.

See N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 41-5 (1984).
Mackie v. Mackie, 230 N.C. 152, 52 S.E.2d 352 (1949).
Id.
State v. Stare, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981).
DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987).
Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
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appointed as a necessary party to a lawsuit.3 9 7 A defendant can
be fined and sentenced up to ten years for the crime of killing a
"quickened" fetus, but a fetus is not a "person" under the state's
murder statute.
Thus, a fetus has a different status in different areas of the
law of North Carolina. How can this be? Is not an unborn child
always an unborn child? How can a child have legally enforceable
rights in one context and be seen as nothing more than a lump of
meaningless tissue in the next? The question of how the present
law has evolved is nothing more than an exercise in legal scholarship tracing the origins of common and statutory law. The more
important question is the one that must be resolved in the minds
of society and in the law: In the course of human development,
from conception forward, when does one become a "person" entitled to the same rights and status under the law as every other
"person" in that society (hereinafter "The Question")? Some would
say this is really a question about when "life" begins. No matter
how one frames the question, the answer sought is the same. Is
an unborn child a "person" from the time he is conceived, or sometime later in his gestational development? Is he a "person" at all
before he is born? These questions are quickly followed by others
equally important. If a child is a "person" at viability but not
before, why? What characteristics does a viable child possess to
make it "worthy" of being deemed a "person" that a nonviable
child does not? The answers to these and other questions have
broad reaching implications for other areas of law in a society. If a
child is a "person" at viability, but not before, based on some measure of cognitive ability or a checklist of bodily parts, the fifty year
old woman who has lost all real cognitive ability through disease
or who was born without some of the body parts on such a list will
need to know if she is still considered a "person."
Inconsistency in state law is difficult enough to resolve, but
the questions become incredibly more complicated when federal
abortion law is thrown into the mix. If society recognizes the
unborn child as a "person" at conception, then a woman's right to
an abortion would necessarily be outweighed by that "person's"
right to life. As the law stands, a woman is legally allowed to take
the life of her unborn child anytime before viability. Anyone else
397. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, Rule 17(b)(4) (1990 & Supp. 1994). For a
complete review of applicable North Carolina law on these subjects, see
Appendix A.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/2
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who does the same thing at any point after quickening will be
imprisoned for ten years.
Many are content with such inconsistency. It is not uncommon for different areas of the law to develop in divergent directions with regard to a common issue. The problem here, however,
is the magnitude of "The Question" is far beyond any that has
been asked in the law to date. Some contend such a question cannot be answered by the law - it is one for philosophers and religion to answer. The harsh reality is that advances in reproductive
technology will force the law to answer "The Question" in the near
future.
In what seems like science-fiction based scenarios, scientists
in laboratories around the world are working on ways to duplicate
and create human beings. In vitro fertilization, the process of conceiving a human child in a test tube, is a common practice. Creating several human embryos at one time for implantation into a
hopeful mother has brought about the freezing of embryos for long
periods of time. In the next year, doctors will be able to remove
the microscopic eggs of a baby girl and preserve them to be fertilized and then implanted into her womb whenever she is ready to
have children, be it age 35 or 65. Goat eggs are being fertilized in
test tubes and placed in a stasis tank for the normal gestational
period, yielding mammals that have never lived inside another.
Scientists have successfully "cloned" human embryos. Work is
being done to allow the transfer of a fetus from one womb to
another.
The development of such incredible technology brings one
back to "The Question" at a startling rate. The scientific community has already begun the struggle to determine whether a
human embryo can be used in experiments. Our courts have just
begun to understand the incredible difficulty in deciding whether
a frozen human embryo is property, a child, or something else.3 98
What is the difficulty and why the struggle? No one wants to
answer, at least in the legal sense, "The Question." If the answer
to "The Question" was that one became a "person" at conception,
there would be no debate over these issues. It would be unthinkable to allow destructive experimentation on "people," and a "person" who is a child would have custody disputes decided according
to existing law.
398. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1259 (1993).
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Even if no one is ready to answer "The Question," the law
should begin to consider the effect of inconsistent results with
regard to the status of the fetus. A hypothetical serves to demonstrate the problem. In California, the court of appeals has held
the state's homicide statute, which states it is murder to intentionally kill a "fetus,"39 9 applies to a nonviable fetus.4 ° ° In the
same year, the California Supreme Court held a surrogate mother
who had not contributed any genetic material to the creation of a
child she carried to term, was a "genetic stranger" to the child and,
thus, had never had any parental rights to him.40 1 An interesting
hypothetical situation thus arises. Assume a couple entered into a
surrogacy contract with a woman who met existing legal criteria,
and in the agreement the surrogate agreed to give up all constitutional rights with regard to abortion. The surrogate is impregnated with an embryo to which she contributed no gamete and is
thus a "genetic stranger" to the unborn child. She carries the
child for the first trimester and decides she wants out of the agreement and no longer wishes to carry the child to term. She obtains
an abortion. Has the surrogate committed homicide in killing a
fetus to which she has no parental rights and for which she has no
constitutional right to abort? Is her action to be considered nothing more than breach of contract? If the jurisdiction recognized
actions for prenatal injury and wrongful death of children in
utero, would the couple whose gametes created the child have
standing to bring either action? Currently, in California, there
are no answers to any of these questions, and it is doubtful any
court is anxious to attempt to formulate any.
A call for an answer to "The Question" is not a call for chaos or
anarchy in the law. It is not even a call for a dramatic departure
from existing trends in the law. It is no more than a realization
that the law must begin to take a realistic approach to dealing
with the medical fact that a fetus is no longer a mysterious movement in a mother's womb. The current law addressing fetal issues
is based on archaic assumptions and on inaccurate information.
The court in Roe v. Wade4 0 2 cited the common law and the intent
of the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment in ruling that a fetus
399. Apart from legal abortion.
400. People v. Davis, 15 Cal. App. 4th 690, review granted and opinion
superseded by, 857 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1993), and aff'd, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
401. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206,
and cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993).
402. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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was not a "person" within that document's meaning.4 °3 The North
Carolina Supreme Court cites the same type of rationale to find an
unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of the state's
constitution.40 4 The fact is, however, both the developers of the
ancient common law rules still in use in much of American law
and the writers of both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions had no idea an unborn child could be completely distinguished from any other human being on the planet from the
moment of conception. Nor did they know a child of ten weeks
gestation has a beating heart and a measurable brain wave.
Surely these people would have been amazed to see the pictures
that are now common fare in books and magazines, showing a tiny
child in the womb, sucking his thumb. No matter how one views
the "correct" answer to "The Question," such an answer must be
arrived at .after an honest examination of the facts. The facts
available to this earlier generation of law makers painted a significantly different picture of what a fetus "is" before birth than the
picture painted today by those responsible for much of the current
law.
North Carolina has made no attempt to answer "The Question." No case or piece of legislation has yet addressed the issues
of surrogate parenthood, in vitro fertilization,40 5 criminal culpability of mothers who abuse drugs while pregnant, fetuses as
insureds under insurance contracts, frozen embryos, cloning, or
any of a host of other issues concerning the legal status of a fetus.
The legislature should forgo shortsightedness and begin to debate
such issues now. Conflicts and inconsistencies in fetal law should
be resolved definitively by legislation. Answering "The Question"
would be a good place to start.

403. Id.
404. See State v. Stam, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981).

405. See Roger B. Bernholz & G. Nicholas Herman, Legal Implications of
Human In Vitro Fertilizationfor the PracticingPhysician in North Carolina, 6
CAMPBELL

L. REV. 5 (1984).
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A

Fetus a
"person?"

Viability
required?

YES
(Supreme Court
has not
specifically
imposed this
requirement)

WRONGFUL

DEATH

(DiDonatov.
Wortman;
N.C.G.S. § 28A18-2)

Types of
Damages
Allowed

Pain and
suffering
Medical and
funeral
expenses
Nominal
damages
Punitive
damages
All damages
available in a
normal tort
action

YES
(this issue was
not reached by
the court, it is
presumed to be
true based on
the court's
language)
Not decided

Not decided

None

Not decided

Not decided

None

YES

Not decided

Not decided

CRnNAL LAW

YES.
N.C.G.S. § 14.
44
NO.
N.C.G.S. § 1417

NO

NO.
Quickening
required for
N.C.G.S. § 1444.

Related to the
pregnancy: pain
and suffering,
medical
expenses, loss
of consortium,
lost wages.
(Possilby child
rearing
expenses in
case where
resulting child
is born
impaired)
Penalty: Fine,
imprisonment
up to 10 years
(Class H
felony), or both.
N.C.G.S. 14-44.

PROPERTY LAW

YES -

Undecided

PRENATAL
INJURIES

(Stetson v.
Easterling)

WRONGFUL LIFE

(Azzolino v.
Dingfelder)
WRONGFUL

BIRTH
(Azzolino v.
Dingfelder)
WRONGFUL
CONCEPTION

(Jackson v.
Bumgardner;
Gallagher v.
Duke (federal))

N.C.G.S. § 41-5

able to

inherit or take
by deed
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2. PRENATAL INJURY
Prenatal Injury: Practice Notes:
A complaint for prenatal injury should include a statement
regarding the viability of the plaintiff only if the child was, in fact,
viable at the time of injury. If the plaintiff was not viable,
however, this point should be omitted altogether so as to avoid
suggesting argument on the issue to the defendant. The
defendant, on the other hand, should look for this fact in the
complaint, and if it is not present, defense counsel should obtain
such information in discovery. Causation is likely to be the
largest issue of proof in a case for prenatal injury. The difficulty
in establishing a causal link between the injuries suffered and the
defendant's actions steadily increases as the gestational age at
which the injuries were inflicted decreases. Therefore, it is very
important for the plaintiff to obtain expert evidence that will
eliminate intervening causes that may have also been responsible
for the same type of injuries. The ultimate goal is to eliminate all
causes but the defendant's actions as a possible cause of the
injuries, so that the jury can infer that such actions must have
been the cause of the injuries. For instance, where the plaintiff's
mother was over forty years of age, it would be important to have
an expert testify to the fact that the type of injuries incurred by
the plaintiff are not the type of complications associated with
childbirth in older women. One of the best ways to establish
causation is to prove that the defendant's actions caused
premature birth, which in turn caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Proving damages also raises complex issues. Economists will
probably be needed to establish any claims for lost earning
capacity, and accordingly, different economic models will need to
be researched. Graphic representation of the plaintiff's damages
in the most basic of forms is a necessity to simplify the process and
to communicate effectively with the jury. A 'day in the life' video
can prove very effective, as can testimony from the family
regarding their observations of what the plaintiff's abilities are at
present.
I.

II. Prenatal Injury: Bibliography:
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(1978).
Frank J. Hartye, Note, Tort Recovery for the Unborn Child,
15 J. FAM. L. 276 (1977).
G. Craig Hubble, Liability of the Physicianfor the Defects of
a Child Caused by In Vitro Fertilization,2 J. LEG. MED. 501
(1981).

Mark L. Johnson, Note, Compensating Parents For The
Loss Of Their Nonfatally Injured Child's Society: Extending
The Notion Of Consortium To The FilialRelationship, 1989
U. ILL. L. REV. 761 (1989).
Lenhardt, Abortion and Pre-Natal Injury: A Legal and
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3.

WRONGFUL DEATH OF UNBORN CHILD
I.

Wrongful Death: Practice Notes:
A.
1.

DEFENSE OF A FETAL WRONGFUL DEATH CASE:

VIABILITY:

Given the current status of the law in North Carolina, defense
counsel should make every effort to discover what evidence is
available on this issue. In a close case, a medical expert will be
needed to examine the medical records pertaining to the mother,
the child's prenatal care, including all testing done, i.e.,
sonograms, ultrasounds, amnioscentesis, etc., and the alleged
death-causing injury. Counsel should also consider taking the
depositions of the doctors responsible for the care of the mother
and child during the pregnancy, and also those allegedly
responsible for the alleged injury. As the crucial issue, doctors
should be required to state their opinions as to the child's viability
at the time the alleged injury was inflicted. If enough evidence
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exists to clearly establish that the child was not viable at the time
of injury, a motion for summary judgment may be appropriate.
Depending on the facts, counsel should consider taking the
position that viability is a relatively concrete concept that can be
established at a certain point during gestation. To argue that
viability is relatively uncertain and difficult to prove with any
certainty opens the possibility for the court to err on the side of
the plaintiff due to the broad remedial purposes of the wrongful
death statute.
The standard list of defenses available in a wrongful death
claim are also applicable to the fetal plaintiff.
2. DAMAGES:
If the case proceeds to trial, the next line of defense will be the
issue of damages. Counsel should remember that the only
damages available to the fetal plaintiff are those for medical and
funeral expenses, pain and suffering, nominal damages, and
punitive damages. Punitive damages, however, are usually of
greatest concern to defense counsel given the potential for a large
verdict. This is especially so in a situation where the jury will be
told it cannot make any award to the estate, i.e., the parents, for
the loss of their child's companionship, society, and the like. The
only real opportunity to vent jury frustration and/or anger
towards the defendant will, therefore, naturally be in the area of
punitive damages. Accordingly, every action must be taken at
every stage of the litigation process to remove the potential for a
recovery of punitive damages. The standard for such damages is
the same as in other cases, and accordingly, appropriate research
should be done.
There exists some question as to the level of proof required of
the plaintiff on the issue of damages for the pain and suffering of
the fetal decedent. The defendant should make a pretrial motion
to exclude such evidence as a matter of law if it appears that the
plaintiff's evidence on this issue is weak or speculative. Given the
language in DiDonatoregarding damages for pain and suffering, a
good faith argument can be made that without competent medical
evidence proving that the fetus was, in fact, capable of feeling
pain, the plaintiff's claim for such damages should be dismissed
and all evidence on this point excluded from the trial. If the
pretrial motion is unsuccessful, another motion can be made at
trial to strike the evidence.
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A WRONGFUL DEATH CASE:

VIABILITY:

The plaintiff bears the burden of production on this issue. To
prevail, medical evidence in the form of records and expert
testimony is needed. Doctors should state with a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that the decedent was viable at the
time the death-causing injury was sustained. Plaintiff can argue
that viability should never be set at more than twenty weeks, as
this is the gestational age at which abortions are prohibited.
Plaintiff can also argue that because viability can never be
established with absolute certainty without putting the fetus to
the actual test of survival, any doubt or ambiguity as to viability
of the decedent should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. This is
especially true given the broad remedial purposes of the wrongful
death statute and the Court's language in DiDonato regarding
who should be regarded as a 'person'.
Finally, the plaintiff must plead in her complaint that the
fetal decedent was viable at the time the alleged injury was
inflicted. Being a threshold issue, such a pleading is essential to

the survival of the cause of action.
2. DAMAGES:
The fetal plaintiff also bears the burden of proving each
element of damages. Nominal damages and medical and funeral
expenses are relatively simple to prove. Plaintiff should present
all medical expenses precipitated by the wrongful act and should
not attempt to separate the mother's expenses from those of the
child. The statute allows recovery of all medical expenses
proximately caused by the tortfeasor's negligence.
The main issue here is the damages for the pain and suffering
of the child before death. Again, medical evidence is crucial, and
the plaintiff should talk with the health providers who treated the
mother and child for the injuries as soon as possible to preserve
any crucial data. Fetal stress monitor printouts are especially
important in this context and should be obtained immediately for
intepretation by experts. Any other indicia of the child's conscious
state prior to death should be carefully noted. This is the single
area of damages, besides punitives, available to the jury to bring
back any sizeable verdict. As such, it should be given thoughtful
attention.
Punitive damages are statutorily available and should be
plead in any case where there is intentional or wreckless conduct
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss2/2
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by the defendant which allegedly caused the child's death. Courts
are unlikely to look favorably on such conduct, and thus are more
likely to allow the punitive damages issue to go to the jury.
Punitive damages should thus be plead whenever good faith
allows, and the claim should be vigorously defended.
A case praying for pecuniary damages and loss of society
damages should be brought so that the issue can possibly be
revisited by the North Carolina Supreme Court on appeal. A case
which presents good data on the progress and health of the fetus
prior to death should be selected to give the court a good scenario
for recognizing a plaintiff's right to attempt to prove these types of
damages.
II.

Wrongful Death: Bibliography:
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WRONGFUL LIFE
I.

Wrongful Birth/Life/Pregnancy: Practice Notes:
The practitioner should throroughly understand the
distinctions between these different causes of action. Wrongful
conception is basically a malpractice claim and should be handled
accordingly. Counsel should remember that the cause of action is
for the parent(s) and not for the resulting child. Counsel should
plead the fact of pregnancy as the injury. Plaintiffs may want to
include a claim that the defendant's actions violated their
constitutional right to control their reproduction.
The defendant should emphasize discovery on the issue of
why the plaintiffs did not want to become pregnant. A desire to
avoid disruption of careers or lifestyle or to avoid bearing a
genetically impaired child more aptly state a claim for money
damages than a claim which expressly a wish to avoid a
pregnancy dangerous to the mother. This is especially true if the
mother delivered without complications, and she had always
wanted the child. Defendant should also discover if the mother
had a normal pregnancy, if she suffered from morning sickness
and for how long, the method of delivery, whether anesthesia was
administered, what type was given and how long it was observed
to be in effect, the length of the labor, and finally whether there
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were any complications in delivery. All of these factors go to the
issue of the mother's pain and suffering arising from the
pregnancy.
Both parties should be mindful of the statute of limitations in
such cases. The North Carolina Supreme Court has not ruled on
when the limitations period will begin to run, though it is likely to
depend on the facts of each case. In failed sterilization cases, for
instance, the limitations period will probably run from the time
the plaintiff discovered that the operation was unsuccessful.
Negligent counseling actions, however, may begin to run at the
time the pregnancy occurred or at the time the negligence is
discovered. Counsel should also consider the role of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur in wrongful conception cases, especially those
revolving around a claim of unsuccessful sterilization.
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